



REPUBLIC OF KENYA

The Annual Report
to
Parliament
on the
State of National Security
by
His Excellency
Hon. William Samoei Ruto, PhD., C.G.H.
President of the Republic of Kenya and
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces

(Submitted pursuant to Article 240 (7) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010
and Section 16 of the National Security Council Act)

NOVEMBER, 2025

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FOREWARD

The Annual Report on the State of National Security is submitted to the National Assembly in line with Article 240 (7) of the Constitution of Kenya and Section 16 of the National Security Council (NSC) Act. It outlines the prevailing and emerging threats to national security and the Government's strategic responses during the review period.

Article 238 of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) defines National Security as the protection against internal and external threats to Kenya's territorial integrity and sovereignty, its people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability, prosperity and other national interests.

Kenya's national security interests and posture are an aggregate of the internal dynamics, the regional and global shifts and transformations. The local security scenario contends with a youth bulge, demand for effective public service delivery, economic pressures and increased adoption of social media largely for advancement of socio-economic activities, but also for perpetration of crime and divisive political mobilization.

During the period under review, the country continued to proactively respond to traditional security threats, including terrorist activities perpetrated by Al-Shabaab militants, especially in the North Eastern Region and the Boni Enclave, which posed threats to local business operations, especially land transport, communication and other public services. Additionally, persistent banditry activities in parts of the North Rift and Upper Eastern regions disrupted socio-economic activities and peaceful coexistence among communities. Inter-communal conflicts, fueled by land disputes, cattle rustling and retaliatory attacks, were also reported in parts of Trans-Mara and along the Migori-Narok county boundary.

The country also witnessed large-scale online mobilization for demonstrations. These protests occasionally escalated into violence due to infiltration by criminal gangs, resulting in loss of lives, widespread destruction and theft of property and disruption of economic activities. The protests, which were initially led by Generation Z (Gen. Z), were a scale up from the previous year.

At the regional level, the conflicts in the Horn of Africa and Central Africa regions impacted negatively on Kenya's security environment. The resultant humanitarian crises, terrorism threat and weak governance in affected countries largely contributed to cross-border insecurity.

Globally, the dynamism of global terrorism networks continued to impact Kenya's national security. Persistent recruitment drives by global terrorist networks and affiliations with local terror groups, particularly Al-Shabaab, driven by pockets of local sympathizers, have

impacted negatively on socio-economic activities in parts of the affected counties. The scenario is exacerbated by the exploitation of local vulnerabilities, especially the growing unemployment rates and online indoctrination and radicalization among the youth.

The global security environment was also defined by rising geopolitical contestations that manifested in theatres such as the transformation of the protracted conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the effect of the current US Administration's America First policy, and the ever-evolving wars in the Middle East. These dynamics have continued to disrupt international trade, increase cost of doing business and upset international relations, consequently affecting Kenya's balance of trade and security.

Climate change remains an existential security threat, with cascading effects on livelihoods, resource competition, migration, and resilience of critical infrastructure. As a frontline state in the Global South, Kenya will continue to experience disproportionate impacts, making the climate-security agenda a central pillar of the country's prioritized national interests.

The Government remains focused on proactively addressing national security concerns through regular legislative reviews, socio-economic empowerment initiatives, citizen engagement in security matters, enhancement of security personnel numbers, retooling of law enforcement agencies, capacity building of the citizenry on the balance between individual and communal rights; forging strategic partnerships and offering credible national governance and leadership.

Overall, the country continued to reap from the resilience of Kenyans to overcome national challenges and deliver on the Vision 2030 goals, the Bottom-up Transformation Agenda (BETA) and the Africa Union's Agenda 2063, as well as meeting the UN's Sustainable Development Goals. The commitment of the Government to these goals continued to inform both short and long-term interventions.

I therefore submit the 2024/ 2025 Annual Report on the State of National Security.

HON. WILLIAM SAMOEI RUTO, PhD., C.G.H.

*President of the Republic of Kenya and
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces.*

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Annual Report on the State of National Security covers the period from 1st September, 2024 to 31st August, 2025. The report is submitted to the National Assembly in accordance with Article 240 (7) of the Constitution of Kenya and Section 16 of the National Security Council (NSC) Act. It outlines the prevailing and emerging threats to national security and the Government's strategic responses during the review period.

The country contended with security threats, including terrorism and violent extremism, cyber threats, organized criminal gangs, money laundering, human and drug trafficking, religious cults, proliferation of small arms and cases of gender-based violence during the period under review. Additionally, undocumented immigrants, economic crimes, contraband trade and the destruction of critical infrastructure complicated internal security efforts. In response to the foregoing, the Government stepped up intelligence-led operations, community policing, legal and policy reforms and strengthening of counterterrorism and financial oversight.

The Government achieved significant milestones in preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism despite the persistence of the threat. Notably, there was enhanced security patrols, interception efforts, public awareness campaigns and the implementation of the Prevention of Violent Extremism frameworks at the National and County levels.

On cybersecurity, there were increased incidents of phishing, data breaches, and digital financial fraud. In response, the Government expanded the capacity of cyber response teams and enhanced cooperation among ICT regulators, security agencies, and the private sector.

Regarding organized crime and money laundering, the report highlights ongoing enforcement efforts and the implementation of the National Action Plan to address Kenya's grey-listing status by Financial Action Task Force.

Efforts to combat drug and substance abuse, especially among the youth, were reinforced through targeted operations that yielded numerous seizures, closing illegal outlets, and launching national awareness and rehabilitation programmes. Incidents of religious extremism prompted a national response involving investigations, prosecutions, and reforms in religious registration and regulation.

Human trafficking and irregular migration persisted due to Kenya's geo-strategic location as a source, transit, and destination country. Government bolstered regional cooperation, victim

rescue operations, and border control. Similarly, the spread of small arms and light weapons remained a concern, with ongoing disarmament initiatives and cross-border tracking mechanisms deployed to address the vice.

Cases of gender-based violence and femicide continued to rise, leading to multi-agency investigations that led to numerous convictions, and the establishment of integrated SGBV centers in the affected counties.

During the period under review, the Government remained committed to addressing the socio-economic factors through youth empowerment, social protection programmes, community engagement and investment in infrastructure development in underserved areas. Environmental security also received attention, with the integration of climate resilience in disaster risk reduction.

Regionally, instability in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions continued to be a significant security concern. Terrorist activities by groups such as Al-Shabaab increased, especially in Southern and Central Somalia, amid the transition from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Kenya remained susceptible to cross-border incursions, particularly in the North Eastern and Coastal regions. The Government responded through multi-agency operations, improved border surveillance and regional security partnerships. Kenya also maintained its contributions to regional peace support initiatives and diplomatic engagements, through platforms such as IGAD and the EAC.

The global political, security and economic dynamics continued to impact the country's national security interests. The persistent geopolitical tensions characterized by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Middle East crisis and shifting global power dynamics — have negatively impacted the energy markets, global supply chains, and economic stability, with attendant effect on Kenya's national security. Additionally, the evolving cyber threats and the misuse of Artificial Intelligence presented emerging threats to critical infrastructure, personal and Government data systems. Notably, Kenya's leading role in the UN Multinational Security Support mission in Haiti registered significant successes despite resource and logistical constraints, further amplifying Kenya's commitment to international peace and security.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFRIPOL	African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation
AI	Artificial Intelligence
AML	Anti-Money Laundering
ASALs	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
AUSSOM	African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia
BETA	Bottom-up Economic Transformation Agenda
BPU	Border Police Unit
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CIDPs	County Integrated Development Plan
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIPU	Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit
COHA	Cessation of hostilities agreement
CPF	Countering Proliferation Financing
CT	Counter Terrorism
CTF	Countering Terrorism Financing
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DCI	Directorate of Criminal Investigations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAPCCO	Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation
EU	European Union
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FRC	Financial Reporting Centre
HEC	Human Elephant Conflict
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ID	Identity Cards
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
JKIA	Jomo Kenyatta International Airport
JSF	Jubaland Security Forces

KCAA	Kenya Civil Aviation Authority
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KEBS	Kenya Bureau of Standards
KEMSA	Kenya Medical Supplies Authority
KNPHI	Kenya National Public Health Institute
KRA	Kenya Revenue Authority
LAPPSET	Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport
MCDA	Ministries, Counties, Departments and Agencies
MCS	Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
MDAs	Ministries, Departments, and Agencies
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NEMA	National Environment Management Authority
NGAO(s)	National Government Administrative Officers
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NLC	National Land Commission
NPS	National Police Service
OLA	Oromo Liberation Army
PPPs	Public-Private Partnerships
SEI	Safety Enhancement Initiatives
SGB	Security of Government Buildings
SGR	Standard Gauge Railway
SHA	Social Health Authority
SHIF	Social Health Insurance Fund
SNA	Somalia National Army
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWARD.....	iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	v
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ix
LIST OF TABLES	xi
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
CHAPTER ONE: NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS	1
1.0 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 GENERAL CRIME	1
1.2 TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM	4
1.3 RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM.....	7
1.4 CYBERCRIME	9
1.5 MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM FINANCING	11
1.6 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS AND HUMAN SMUGGLING	12
1.7 DRUG TRAFFICKING	13
1.8 SOCIAL UNREST	16
1.9 INSECURITY IN INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING	18
1.10 SECURITY BREACHES IN CRITICAL GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE.....	21
1.11 REFUGEES	22
1.12 CATTLE RUSTLING AND STOCK THEFT	24
1.13 INTER-COMMUNAL CONFLICTS AND BOUNDARY DISPUTES.....	26
1.14 ILLICIT SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS	29
1.15 CROSS BORDER INCURSIONS	30
1.16 MARITIME SECURITY	32
1.18 PUBLIC HEALTH SECURITY	34
1.18.1 Universal Health Coverage.....	34
1.18.2 Public Health Epidemics	36
1.19 BIOSECURITY	38
1.20 WILDLIFE SECURITY	38
1.21 AVIATION SECURITY	40
1.22 NATURAL RESOURCE SECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE	42
1.22.1 Natural Resource Security	42
1.22.2 Climate Change	46
1.23 ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GANGS	48
1.24 KIDNAPPING AND ABDUCTION.....	51
1.25 DRUGS AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE.....	52
1.27 ILLICIT BREWS	55
1.28 ILLEGAL ALIENS AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS	57
1.29 TRADE IN CONTRABAND AND COUNTERFEIT PRODUCTS	59
1.30 SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE	61

1.30.1 Gender Disparities in Perpetration	62
1.30.2 Analysis of SGBV Victims.....	62
1.31 ROAD SAFETY AND TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT.....	64
1.31.1 Categories of Accident Victims	65
1.31.2 Fatalities as Per Road User Group.....	66
1.32 BODA-BODA SECTOR.....	69
1.33 GAMING AND GAMBLING.....	70
1.34 UNEMPLOYMENT.....	72
1.35 CORRUPTION.....	74
1.36 DOCUMENT FRAUD	76
1.37 REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY LANDSCAPE.....	77
Regional Landscape.....	77
1.37.1 Horn of Africa	77
1.31.2 Great Lakes Region	79
1.31.3 East Africa	79
1.37.4 Global Security Landscape	80
2.38 KENYA'S DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC POSTURE	82
2.0 CHAPTER TWO: CROSS-CUTTING INITIATIVES	83
2.1 BOTTOM-UP ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AGENDA (BETA).....	83
2.2 YOUTH EMPOWERMENT	83
2.3 ABOLISHING VETTING FOR NATIONAL ID CARD REGISTRATION.....	84
2.4 E-CITIZEN SERVICE DELIVERY	85
2.5 LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT/AMENDMENTS AND POLICIES	86
2.6 SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS.....	87
2.7 WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH	90
2.8 PROMOTION OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS	91
CHAPTER THREE: RECOMMENDATIONS	92
CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION	94
ANNEXE 1: DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES SUMMARIES FOR SEPTEMBER, 2024 TO AUGUST, 2025.....	95
ANNEX II: COUNTY ANALYSIS OF LIVESTOCK THEFT	96
ANNEX III: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL ILLICIT BREWS –RELATED DATA	99
ANNEX IV: COUNTY ANALYSIS OF SGBV CASES.....	100
ANNEX V: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS	102

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: Comparative Crime Figures for General Crimes	2
Table 1.2: Breakdown of category of victims per county from September, 2024 to August, 2025	5
Table 1.3: A summary of Seizures and Arrest of drugs and psychotropic substance	14
Table 1.4: Summary of statistics of damages caused during the protests	16
Table 1.5: Number of cases of fatalities and injured persons per region	19
Table 1.6: Comparative summary of Number of Livestock stolen during the periods	25
Table 1.7: Summary of Number of persons killed, injured and those suspects arrested over livestock theft	25
Table 1.8: Summary of numbers of Ethnic Conflict	27
Table 1.9: Number of Illicit SALW Recovered	29
Table 1.10: Reported Cases of Epidemics	36
Table 1.11: Number of Trees grown under the 15 Billion Trees Initiative	43
Table 1.12: Comparative Criminal Gang Analysis for September, 2023 – August, 2024 and September, 2024 – August, 2025	49
Table 1.13: Kidnappings Comparative Figures per Region	51
Table 1.14: Summary of number of Seizures and Arrest	53
Table 1.15: Nationalities of Illegal Aliens and Undocumented Immigrants Arrested	57
Table 1.16: The Number of Contrabands intercepted	59
Table 1.17: Gender disparities in perpetration	62
Table 1.18: Analysis of SGBV victims	63
Table.1.19: Comparison of Road Traffic Accident Victims	65
Table 1.20: Comparison of Fatalities as per Road User Group.....	66
Table 1.21: Table of Distribution of Fatalities per Month	66

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Bar graph showing statistics of terror incidences per county from September, 2024 to August, 2025	5
Figure 1.2: Number of security incidences in learning institutions	19
Figure 1.3: Comparative Number of Cases of SGBV reported	62
Figure 1.4: Comparative Analysis of Accidents	65

CHAPTER ONE: NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The national security environment continues to be shaped by evolving geopolitical dynamics, regional instability and internal socio-economic and political pressures. Currently, key areas of concern include terrorism and violent extremism, border security, cyber threats, religious extremism, social unrest, security breaches to critical infrastructure, banditry and cattle rustling and transnational organized crime. The security posture has remained proactive, with enhanced multi-agency intelligence-led operations and strategic partnerships aimed at safeguarding national interests.

1.1 GENERAL CRIME

Crime remains a significant concern in Kenya and is prevalent in both urban and rural areas. The types of crimes commonly reported range from violent crimes, such as armed robbery and assault, to non-violent crimes, including theft, fraud and cybercrime.

During the period under review, a total of **97,366** cases was reported in the period between September, 2024 – August, 2025 as compared to **103,536** cases during a similar period in 2023/2024 representing a decrease of **6,170** cases or **6%**.

Decrease in crime rates was recorded in most categories of offences except traffic offences, criminal cases, offences involving Police Officers and other penal code offences as illustrated in Table 1.1. There was general decline in cases of Break-ins, Theft of Stock, Vehicle/Theft, and possession of Dangerous Drugs. Traffic Offences dropped massively in 2023–24, then rebounded in 2024–25 (+70%). Similarly, Offences Involving Police Officers spiked in 2023–24, remained elevated in 2024–25. Other Penal Code Offences recorded a significant rise in 2023–24, continued an upward growth into 2024–25.

Table 1.1: Comparative Crime Figures for General Crimes

S/NO.	CATEGORIES	SEPT., 22- AUG., 23	SEPT., 23- AUG., 24	VAR	% VAR	SEPT., 23 - AUG., 24	SEPT., 24- AUG., 25	VAR	% Change
1.	Homicide	3,036	3,069	33	1.1	3,069	2,806	-263	-8.6
2.	Offences Against Morality	7,476	7,662	186	2.5	7,662	7,247	-415	-5.4
3.	Other Offences Against Persons	24,504	25,332	828	3.4	25,332	24,531	-801	-3.2
4.	Robbery	3,855	3,675	-180	-4.7	3,675	3,428	-247	-6.7
5.	Break-ins	6,847	6,251	-596	-8.7	6,251	5,350	-901	-14.4
6.	Theft of Stock	2,934	2,611	-323	-11.0	2,611	2,336	-275	-10.5
7.	Stealing	17,783	18,253	470	2.6	18,253	16,763	-1,490	-8.2
8.	Theft by Servant	1,907	1,666	-241	-12.6	1,666	1,502	-164	-9.8
9.	Vehicle and Other Thefts	1,694	1,470	-224	-13.2	1,470	1,291	-179	-12.2
10.	Dangerous Drugs	8,881	8,525	-356	-4.0	8,525	7,079	-1,446	-17.0
11.	Traffic Offences	182	70	-112	-61.5	70	119	49	70.0
12.	Criminal Damage	4,815	5,072	257	5.3	5,072	5,108	36	0.7
13.	Economic Crimes	4,691	4,890	199	4.2	4,890	4,359	-531	-10.9
14.	Corruption	113	99	-14	-12.4	99	92	-7	-7.1
15.	Offences Involving Police Officers	135	230	95	70.4	230	237	7	3.0
16.	Offences Involving Tourist	41	49	8	19.5	49	46	-3	-6.1
17.	Other Penal Code Offences	11,757	14,612	2,855	24.3	14,612	15,072	460	3.1
	TOTAL	100,651	103,536	2,885	2.9	103,536	97,366	-6,170	-6

To address general crimes and enhance public safety, the Government implemented a range of measures focused on strengthening law enforcement, community involvement, socio-economic interventions, and criminal justice sector reforms, as well as technological advancements, including:

- a) Public awareness campaigns to educate citizens on crime prevention and promote public safety;

- b) Retraining and capacity building for Police Officers to enhance professionalism, service delivery and responsiveness to emerging security challenges;
- c) Economic empowerment initiatives, such as the *Climate Worx* and employment creation through Affordable Housing Projects;
- d) Targeted deployment of specialized security teams to high-risk areas to improve responsiveness and deterrence;
- e) Revitalization of Community Policing initiatives to strengthen collaboration between the public and law enforcement; and
- f) Modernization of Police equipment and infrastructure.

Despite ongoing efforts, several constraints continue to hinder the effective enforcement of law and order:

- a) Inadequate tooling, equipment and human resources across security agencies, limiting operational effectiveness;
- b) Technological gaps in combating cyber and IT-related threats;
- c) High levels of youth unemployment, contributing to vulnerability to crime and radicalization; and
- d) Increased use of social media for criminal purposes, including co-ordination, misinformation and recruitment.

Going forward, the Government remains committed to ensuring a safe and secure environment conducive to sustainable development by:

- a) Recruitment and expansion of the security workforce, including police officers and National Police Reservists (NPRs), to meet the growing security demands across the country;
- b) Acquisition of modern tools and equipment to improve the operational capacity and effectiveness of law enforcement agencies;
- c) Development of critical infrastructure, particularly road networks in volatile and hard-to-reach areas, to improve accessibility and support rapid response; and

- d) Scaling up socio-economic development projects, including youth-focused initiatives, to address unemployment and reduce vulnerability to crime.

1.2 TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Terrorism and violent extremism remain a threat to international peace and security. Terror organizations, particularly Al-Shabaab and Islamic State, continue to evolve by enhancing their networks, adopting new *modus operandi*, intensifying propaganda and leveraging technologies to perpetrate their heinous acts.

Al-Shabaab continues to exploit the ATMIS/AUSSOM transition, reduced troops' presence, clan dynamics and political instability in Somalia to intensify attacks, with intentions to expand areas under its control.

During the period under review, Al-Shabaab's activities were characterized by probing attacks on security agencies, critical infrastructure and security installations and emplacement of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) along the main supply routes, as well as targeted killings and abductions. Al-Shabaab's threat to Kenya, was also compounded by continued radicalization and recruitment of vulnerable youth across the country to join the terrorist group.

Kenya's security teams frequently intercepted Al-Shabaab militants along the Kenya-Somalia border attempting to infiltrate into the country. Al-Shabaab also sustained collection of *zakat* and kidnapping for ransom, as well as illegal taxation and extortion, besides receiving donations from sympathizers to facilitate its terrorist operations.

Al-Shabaab continued to exploit the porous Kenya-Somalia border to infiltrate and launch attacks in parts of Kenya's North Eastern and Coast regions. Notably, the most affected areas included:

- a) Arabia-Fino-Lafey-Elwak corridor within Mandera County;
- b) El Ram-Kotulo-Khorof Harar-Wajir axis within Wajir County;
- c) Liboi-Kulan-Amuma-Hulugho-Galmagalla-Sangailu-Ijara corridor within Garissa County; and
- d) Boni Forest Enclave especially, along Kamuthe and Digdiga within Bura East; Kamuthe-Korakora-Nanighi stretch as well as the LAPSSET corridor within Lamu County.

A total of sixty-one (61) terror-related incidents were reported, including fifteen (15) active shooter incidents, twenty (20) IED attacks, nine (9) kidnapping incidents, affecting one hundred and nineteen (119) victims. Figure 1.1 and Table 1.2 summarize the terror incidences and victims respectively.




Figure 1.1: Bar graph showing statistics of terror incidences per county from September, 2024 to August, 2025

Table 1.2: Breakdown of category of victims per county from September 2024 to August, 2025

	Mandera		Wajir		Garissa		Lamu		Total	
	Officers	Civilians	Officers	Civilians	Officers	Civilians	Officers	Civilians	Officers	Civilians
Killed	6	5	0	4	6	2	8	0	20	11
Injured	35	10	8	0	10	6	10	0	63	16
Kidnapped	1	6	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	8
TOTAL	42	21	8	5	16	9	18	0	84	35

To address the terrorism threat, the Government has continued to adopt tactical, operational and strategic interventions that include:

- a) Enhanced timely intelligence collection and sharing among relevant security agencies;
- b) Deployment of advanced surveillance systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor porous borders and areas surrounding critical infrastructure;

- c) Reviewing policies to enhance counter-terrorism measures, including adoption of the National Strategy for Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism (NSPCVE) 2025;
- d) Enhanced Multi-Agency Security approaches to synchronize counterterrorism coordination and bolster operational efficiency;
- e) Capacity building for the public and private sector, through training and security surveys, to strengthen their capabilities to detect, disrupt and deter terrorism;
- f) Stepped-up disengagement, de-radicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration programs targeting violent extremists and returnees;
- g) Increased collaboration through regional and international cooperation forums that have facilitated transnational coordination operations and exchange of best practices;
- h) Rolled out socio-economic development projects such as roads, education facilities and security camps in the affected counties to address vulnerabilities exploited by terrorists to radicalize and recruit the communities; and
- i) Arrest and prosecution in courts of law of terror suspects.

However, the following challenges were experienced:

- a) Socio-economic vulnerabilities, including unemployment and perceived economic marginalization continue to predispose susceptible youth to terrorist's radicalization and recruitment;
- b) Kenya's porous borders are exposing the country to infiltration by terror elements;
- c) Kakuma and Dadaab Refugee camps have been used by terror groups to advance their cause;
- d) Presence of local facilitation networks, sympathizers and proxies is aiding terrorist activities within the country;
- e) Challenging terrain is hampering security operations particularly in parts of North Eastern Region and the Boni Enclave; and
- f) The transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM presented security gaps that were exploited by Al-Shabaab.

Going forward, the Government remains committed to:

- a) Supporting multipronged counterterrorism efforts through multiagency security operations, continued NCTC-community engagements and enlisting of Civil Society Organizations to advance Prevention and Counter Violent Extremism (PCVE) programmes;
- b) Developing and mainstreaming of CT legislations, particularly the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism Act across all levels of Government to advance soft approaches CT efforts;
- c) Modernizing of security equipment, intelligence collection, as well as analytic tools;
- d) Fast-tracking the development of the Community Policing Policy (2025) to revitalize initiatives such as *Nyumba Kumi*;
- e) Promoting peace building and conflict management initiatives; and
- f) Prioritizing the protection of main supply routes and critical corridors, including LAPSSSET, to safeguard national economic assets and enhanced community resilience in affected areas.

1.3 RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

The country continued to grapple with the aftershocks of the 2023 Shakahola massacre. During the period under review, there was discovery of mass graves in Kwa Binzaro, Kilifi County. Other incidents of religious extremism were reported in Migori and Meru Counties. In addition, scattered across the country are pockets of religious extremists who defy Government programmes, such as vaccinations, school enrolment and medical treatment.

These incidents have brought to the fore the existence of religious extremist organizations, sects and cults in the country. Notably, radicalized elements masquerading as religious entities continue to perpetrate acts of violence, undermining security and communal harmony.

Additionally, the reviews carried out nationally by the Taskforce on the Review of the Legal and Regulatory Framework Governing Religious Organizations in Kenya, 2023, identified factors that predispose vulnerable citizens to exploitation. These include lack of civic education, mentorship and good role models; the erosion of national values and principles that foster patriotism; the persistence of repugnant beliefs and cultural practices; economic despair, social alienation and regulatory gaps.

The Government remains committed to addressing the menace and has continued to collaborate with all religious stakeholders to devise sustainable strategies to regulate religious space in the country by implementing meaningful reforms and building societal resilience.

However, efforts to legislate against religious extremism have faced opposition from various quarters. Other challenges include:

- a) Slow uptake of the registration of religious groups, including small “fellowships” or “religious study groups” operating in private homes;
- b) Digital sanctuaries – religious groups are migrating operations to encrypted platforms like WhatsApp and Telegram, complicating efforts to track and counter indoctrination;
- c) Criminals camouflage their intentions by registering as Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), PBOs, or businesses to mask their true activities; and
- d) Psychological vulnerability, mental health challenges and lack of awareness among the citizenry continue to increase susceptibility to religious extremism.

Going forward, the Government will:

- a) Fast-track the amendment of the Societies Act, Cap. 108 of the Laws of Kenya, geared towards effective law enforcement strategies to dismantle harmful organizations;
- b) Enhance intelligence gathering and early warning capabilities;
- c) Promote alternative-narratives in partnership with FBOs, CSOs and other stakeholders; and
- d) Enhance the promotion of education and awareness.

1.4 CYBERCRIME

Cybercrime poses a significant risk to individuals, institutions and Government entities. Common cyber threats manifest through online fraud, phishing, system hacking, data breaches and identity theft, as well as misinformation and disinformation. Notably, Artificial Intelligence (AI)-powered attacks such as social engineering, botnets, polymorphic malware and deep fakes are increasingly used to automate and scale attacks.

During the period under review, most cyberattacks targeted state agencies, cloud service providers and academic institutions, many leveraging AI-generated deep fakes to impersonate public figures and attempt to influence public discourse, thereby triggering concerns of espionage, system disruption or data theft. Some of the Government institutions that were targeted for cybercrime included the National Drought Management Authority, Kenya School of Government, The Judiciary, Office of Director of Public Prosecution and Kenya Ports Authority. The reported cybercrimes varied from data breaches to defamation of personnel, and leakage of personal data among others.

Additionally, Kenya's cyber space continues to be an enabler of transnational organized crimes through radicalization and recruitment into extremism, financing, communication and planning of cybercrimes. These threats jeopardize digital infrastructure, economic stability and national security.

During the period under review, Kenya experienced an upsurge in cyber threats with over 4 billion cyber threat incidents detected. This is largely attributed to inadequacies in management of public data, gaps in the legal frameworks, rapid proliferation of Internet of Things, low levels of cyber security awareness, laxity among users and delayed patching of software vulnerabilities. In addition, cybercriminals exploit crypto currency platforms for fraud, ransomware payments and anonymous transactions, thereby fueling the rise in cybercrime.

During the period under review, the following measures were taken to address cyber security:

- a) Sustained investment in cyber security systems, including the training of law enforcement personnel in digital forensics and supporting real-time cyber threat intelligence sharing;
- b) Expedited response mechanisms on cybercrime cases and prosecution of perpetrators;

- c) Stepped-up capacity building, awareness and public sensitization campaigns on cyber threats;
- d) Collaborated with international and regional partners, among them the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the African Union Mechanism for Police Co-operation (AFRIPOL) and Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Co-operation (EAPCCO) on cybercrime response;
- e) Strengthened partnership with technology companies to track and shut down online activities of criminal networks; and
- f) Launched the National Artificial Intelligence Strategy (2025–2030), in March, 2025 outlining pillars around AI infrastructure, data policy, research, and governance.

Some of the key challenges experienced included:

- a) Rapidly evolving cyber threats and associated complexities;
- b) Low public awareness and laxity on cyber security practices; and
- c) Weak co-ordination frameworks between the public and relevant private sector ICT firms to address cybercrime.

Going forward, the Government will:

- a) Fast-track Kenya's accession to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, thereby strengthening cross-border cooperation in combating offences such as illegal access, data interference, computer-related fraud and other evolving cyber threats;
- b) Enhance respective capacities to deal with cybercrime through training and acquisition of modern forensic tools;
- c) Promote cyber security awareness and digital literacy at all levels;
- d) Enhance regional and international cooperation in tracking and prosecuting cyber criminals;
- e) Enforce compliance with data protection regulations and national cyber security frameworks;
- f) Leverage on research and development to stay abreast with technological advancements in the ICT sector, including AI-driven detection and response tools;

- g) Implement the Cyber Crimes Strategy, AI Strategy, and Kenya Digital Master plan; and
- h) Finalize the enactment of Robotics & AI Bill (2025) and development of AI Code of Practice.

1.5 MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM FINANCING

Money laundering and terrorism financing continue to threaten the country's financial system, undermine socio economic development and pose risks to national security. Money laundering enables criminals to conceal proceeds of crime while terrorism financing supports networks that orchestrate violence and threaten the safety and wellbeing of the citizenry. Kenya's National Risk Assessment on money laundering identifies fraud, corruption and economic crimes, procurement irregularities, tax-related crimes and bribery as some of the techniques used in generating proceeds for money laundering.

Despite the Country's commitment to meeting the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Standards, it remains in the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring (Grey List) due to strategic deficiencies in its AML/CTF framework. Further, the European Union (EU) added Kenya to the list of high-risk countries for money laundering and terrorism financing. The EU Member States are implementing enhanced due diligence measures when dealing with financial institutions or transactions originating from Kenya.

Nonetheless, Kenya remains committed to reforms and heightened cooperation with FATF to restore its standing and protect its financial systems and economy from illicit activities. To this end, significant strides have been made in addressing the identified deficiencies including enactment of key legislation and updating its national AML/CFT strategies. Some of the measures taken during the period under review to address the deficiencies include:

- a) Legislative and institutional reforms including the omnibus amendment enacted through the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act, 2025;
- b) Enacted the Virtual Assets Service Providers (VASPs) Act, 2025;
- c) Implementing the national AML/CFT strategies in line with the identified ML/TF risks following completion of the national AML/TF risk assessments; and

- d) Roll out of technical capacity building initiatives to improve compliance with AML/CFT obligations by reporting institutions and supervisory bodies, especially in the DNFPB sector.

Despite Government's commitment to address money laundering and terrorism financing, the following challenges are derailing the efforts:

- a) Low levels of compliance and effectiveness in implementation of FATF standards;
- b) Resource and budgetary constraints to implement all the action plan items;
- c) Low ML/TF prosecutions and convictions consistent with Kenya's ML/TF risk profile;
- d) Inadequate trained personnel involved in the AML/CFT/CPF framework across most of the agencies; and
- e) Delays in enactment of legislations such as Trust Administration Bill, 2025.

Going forward, the Government will:

- a) Enhance training and awareness on FATF standards among stakeholders;
- b) Enhance allocation of adequate resources to capacitate key entities in the AML/CFT/CPF landscape;
- c) Strengthen inter-agency cooperation to forge synergy in intelligence collection, investigation and prosecution of money laundering and terrorism financing; and
- d) Fast-track passage of relevant legal frameworks that supports efforts to meet FATF standards such as the Trust Administration Bill, 2025.

1.6 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS AND HUMAN SMUGGLING

Kenya continues to be exploited as a source, transit and destination for trafficked and smuggled persons. During the period under review, the country witnessed persistent activities of transnational human trafficking and smuggling syndicates that posed a threat to national security. The persistence of this vice was attributed to inadequacies in law enforcement and border management, economic vulnerabilities especially among the youth due to unemployment as well as fragility of some states within the region.

Human smuggling syndicates capitalized on the influx of refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented aliens to perpetuate their activities. Smuggled persons during the period under review included Kenyans, Somalis, Ethiopians, Eritreans, Burundians, Rwandese, Congolese, Nigerians, Tanzanians and Ugandans.

The following measures have been taken to address the menace:

- a) Intensified intelligence-led security operations targeting human trafficking and smuggling syndicates;
- b) Investigating, arresting and prosecution of perpetrators;
- c) Repatriation and rescue of human smuggling victims; and
- d) Enhanced multi-agency collaboration to counter the threat.

However, the following challenges hampered efforts to contain the vice:

- a) Exploitation of Kenya's porous borders for illegal entry; and
- b) Lack of awareness among vulnerable individuals which makes them susceptible to trafficking and smuggling.

Going forward, the Government is committed to:

- a) Reviewing legal frameworks and enhancing the criminal justice system's capacity to counter human trafficking and smuggling;
- b) Regularly training and sensitizing all stakeholders for efficient management and control of the vice;
- c) Enhancing regional and international cooperation to address trafficking menace; and
- d) Implementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) Convention and its Protocols.

1.7 DRUG TRAFFICKING

Drug trafficking and substance abuse in Kenya remains a significant national security concern and has been identified as major threat to the well-being of citizens and national development. The country remains a transit point for narcotics, with drugs being trafficked to various destinations, including Southern and Western Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas. During the period under review, drug trafficking and substance abuse was prevalent in

Mombasa, Migori, Kwale, Kilifi, Lamu, Nairobi, Kisii, Isiolo, Marsabit and Garissa counties, where Bhang, heroin, cocaine and methamphetamine among other synthetic drugs were trafficked and consumed.

Narco-traffickers exploited ungazetted entry points along Kenya’s borders with Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda to smuggle drugs into the country and to subsequently transfer them to other countries, including the Middle East. This has contributed to significant social ills such as addiction, drug-related crimes, and social breakdown. The widespread use of drugs and substance abuse among the youth not only affects the individual users and abusers, but also their families and the society at large. The menace has also culminated in financial burden on the health sector, with millions of shillings being spent annually on treating drug-related issues.

In the period under review, there have been multiple seizures of narcotics and illegal drugs as shown in the table below while arrests have been made in various parts of the country. In total **6,062** persons were arrested (**5,515** males and **547** female). Out of these arrests, **647** cases were finalized, **5,415** cases pending before court, **15** cases were pending arrest of known accused persons and **38** cases pending under investigation. Table 1.3 is a summary of Seizures and Arrest of drugs during the period under review.

Table 1.3: A summary of Seizures and Arrest of drugs and psychotropic substance

Type of Drug	No. of Persons Arrested	No. of Males Arrested	No. of Females Arrested	No. of Kenyans Arrested	No. of Foreigners Arrested	Quantity of Drug (Gms)
Heroin	28	21	7	25	3	189 sachets; 7000gms
Cocaine	35	21	14	30	5	44 Pellets; 76 Satchets; 12,800gms
Psychotropic Substances:						
Cozepam	1	1	0	1	0	28 tablets
Diazepam	4	4	0	4	0	264 tablets
Meth	1	0	1	1	0	1000 grams
Mdma	2	2	0	1	1	145 tablets and 10 grams
Bhang	5991	5466	525	5981	10	34 pellets, 1,538 sachets, 12 tablets, 20,932,000 grams, 156,184 rolls, 389 bales, 10,799 plants, 3,092 brooms, and 962 stones
Total	6062	5515	547	6043	19	

Cognizant of the inherent dangers associated with drug trafficking and abuse to the nation; the Government implemented the following measures:

- a) Sustained security crackdown to arrest perpetrators, seize and destroy drugs as well as prosecute offenders;
- b) Reviewed legal and regulatory policy frameworks;
- c) Supported the rehabilitation programmes for addicts;
- d) Collaborated with various local, regional and international agencies, such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Police (INTERPOL);
- e) Sustained intelligence-led security operations targeting narco-trafficking networks in the country, including identification of major transit routes used by traffickers;
- f) Deported foreigners linked to drug trafficking after due process; and
- g) Enhanced capacity building for enforcement officers.

The following challenges hindered the containment of the vice during the period under review:

- a) The high demand for drugs;
- b) Inadequate rehabilitation centers and treatment programmes for drug users, which limit effective reintegration of offenders;
- c) The involvement of international drug cartels and organized syndicates that facilitate cross border drug distribution;
- d) Inadequate community involvement in anti-drug efforts, leading to underreporting and non-cooperation;
- e) Political instability in neighboring countries, facilitating cross-border trafficking; and
- f) Porous borders and corruption that is enabling smuggling of narcotics.

Going forward, the Government is committed to:

- a) Strengthening border security and reinvigorating regional and international co-operation in the fight against drug trafficking;

- b) Supporting the introduction of stringent penalties for drug trafficking, possession, and cultivation for deterrence;
- c) Increasing public awareness campaigns focusing on the prevention of drug abuse, especially targeting educational institutions and communities as well as supporting rehabilitation programmes, through the Whole-of-Government approach;
- d) Enhancing surveillance and intelligence-led security operations to counter evolving and complex nature of drug trafficking; and
- e) Continuous capacity building for the criminal justice system personnel to enhance the investigation and prosecution of drug-related cases.

1.8 SOCIAL UNREST

Over the past one year, the country has experienced sporadic demonstrations that degenerated into violence which undermined public order. The protests, mainly led by activists, a section of youths and politicians, were largely driven by concerns over the rising cost of living, claims of highhandedness by law enforcement personnel and incitement of the public. While the right to peaceful assembly is enshrined in the Constitution under Articles 33, 36 and 37, the protest mobilizers disregarded statutory procedures such as the requirement to formally notify the police of planned demonstrations, thus creating security gaps.

Criminal gangs and hired goons capitalized on the situation to infiltrate the demonstrations, leading to violence, looting and destruction of property. During the period under review, the commemoration of *Saba Saba* and the 2024 *Gen Z* protests culminated in violence, leading to deaths and injuries to both Police Officers as well as civilians, and destruction of property as indicated in the Table 1.4 below:

Table 1.4: Summary of statistics of damages caused during the protests

Fatalities	Police	0
	Civilians	42
Injuries	Police	496
	Civilians	96
Motor Vehicles Damaged	Police Vehicles	142
	Other GK Vehicles	29

	Civilian	78
No. of Police Stations/Posts attacked/Destroyed		12
Firearms Stolen		6
Firearms Destroyed		4
No. of Other Gov't Offices/premises destroyed		16
No. of Supermarkets vandalized, destroyed and looted		18
No. of banks and micro-finance institution vandalized and looted		5
Arrests		1,732

Further, the exploitation of social and mainstream media played a significant role in mobilizing demonstrators, co-ordinating protests as well as propagating misinformation, propaganda, disinformation and hate speech.

The highly charged political environment, characterized by instances of political intolerance and propagation of incendiary rhetoric, complicated security management efforts. Additionally, political realignments based on ethnic considerations threatened to polarize the country and undermine national unity.

To effectively handle violent protests, the Government:

- a) Strengthened multi-agency co-ordination, including deployment of rapid tactical teams and aerial surveillance, for effective crowd control and operational efficiency;
- b) Enhanced checks at access points to critical government installations, including Parliament, State House and Supreme Court;
- c) Expedited investigations on perpetrators, mobilizers and facilitators of acts of lawlessness leading to 1,732 arrests across the country;
- d) Scaled up media engagement and public communication to combat misinformation and foster public trust;
- e) Embraced political inclusivity in government;
- f) Revitalized youth empowerment initiatives such as the *Kazi Majuu* and *Climate Worx* programmes; and

- g) Commissioned the Panel of Experts on Compensation of Victims of Demonstrations and Public Protests

Despite the above efforts, prevailing challenges are undermining Government efforts to address the threat. These include:

- a) Continued exploitation of rights enshrined in the Constitution to agitate for frequent protests;
- b) Political polarization and proliferation of criminal gangs across the country;
- c) Growing abuse of social media platforms which are largely foreign owned; and
- d) Increased youth vulnerability owing to high unemployment rates and drug and substance abuse.

Going forward, the Government intends to:

- a) Continue to promote dialogue to address underlying public grievances;
- b) Enhance the capacity of relevant bodies to deploy modern surveillance and intelligence technologies for early identification, monitoring and assessment of security threats;
- c) Enhance law enforcement efforts by introducing suburb-level patrols; establishment of a dedicated digital intelligence unit and rapid response protocols as well as develop legal frameworks for digital policing;
- d) Promote human rights-based and de-escalation-focused training for all security personnel and adopt non-lethal crowd control tools and reduce overreliance on the use of force; and
- e) Continue to strengthen socio-economic empowerment programmes targeting the youth such as *Climate Worx*, *Kazi Majuu* and job opportunities availed through the Affordable Housing programme.

1.9 INSECURITY IN INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

Insecurity within institutions of learning was prevalent during the period under review. Notably, the insecurity was exemplified by incidences of arson, student riots, unrest, break-ins, drug and substance abuse and sexual offences.

The unrest in institutions of learning was largely attributed to management inefficiencies, inadequate mentorship programmes for students, drug and substance abuse, as well as peer pressure. The ensuing trend also affected the safety and security of learning institutions with property worth **KSh. 21,977,500** destroyed. Elsewhere, reinstatement of the Higher Education Funding (HEF) model by the Court of Appeal heightened apprehension among university students. Figure 1.2 presents the summary of incidents in learning institutions.




Figure 1.2: Number of security incidences in learning institutions

School Unrest: The 65% increase may be linked to broader national unrest. In 2024, Kenya experienced its highest number of protests and riots in over three decades, with 2,005 demonstration events recorded. Notably, July, 2024 saw 250 demonstrations, the highest monthly count. On the other hand, School Fires registered a 75% rise and 200% increase in arson cases. Regionally, number of cases of fatalities and injured persons is summarized in Table 1.5.

Table 1.5: Number of cases of fatalities and injured persons per region

COUNTY	FATALITIES		INJURED PERSONS	
	Students	Non-Students	Students	Non-Students
Eastern	0	1	19	0
Central	21	0	78	1
Rift Valley	0	0	11	0

COUNTY	FATALITIES		INJURED PERSONS	
	Students	Non-Students	Students	Non-Students
Western	0	0	69	3
Nyanza	0	0	27	0
TOTAL	21	1	204	4

The following measures have been taken to enhance security in learning institutions:

- a) Deployment of security personnel in a few violence prone schools and institutions of higher learning to prevent escalation of violence and unrest;
- b) Regular monitoring of schools to detect early warning signs of unrest or violent behavior;
- c) Collaboration with stakeholders to address underlying issues contributing to insecurity in schools; and
- d) Introduction of programmes aimed at promoting peaceful conflict resolution and emotional intelligence among students.

The following challenges hampered efforts to address the menace:

- a) Limited structured engagement between the school management and the students to identify early warning signs and address grievances;
- b) Delayed installation of surveillance cameras by majority of institutions of learning; and
- c) Inadequate mentorship programmes for students leading to increased delinquency.

In view of the foregoing, the Government is planning to:

- a) Strengthen partnerships between Government, school managements and parents;
- b) Implement comprehensive safety protocols and emergency response plans for schools;
- c) Increase funding for school security infrastructure, such as fencing, surveillance systems and deployment of security personnel;
- d) Incorporate peace-building and conflict resolution mechanisms in the education curriculum to prevent future unrest; and

- e) Enhance resource allocation for mental health support and counseling services for students to address underlying emotional issues.

1.10 SECURITY BREACHES IN CRITICAL GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE

Security of critical infrastructure, including National and County Government buildings, highway infrastructure, Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), power sub-stations, telecommunication masts, border posts and security installations remained a significant concern. During the review period, the country witnessed a significant increase in incidents involving unauthorized access, sabotage, vandalism and insider threats targeting key government installations. Notably, criminals continued to target these critical infrastructures for theft, vandalism and sabotage.

The destruction of infrastructure and theft of valuable materials occasioned significant economic losses for both the public and private sectors during the review period. Similarly, vandalism of power lines and telecommunication infrastructure also increased power outages and communication disruptions, severely impacting businesses, households and critical services like healthcare and education. Further, the destruction of communication masts by Al-Shabaab militants in affected parts of the country, jeopardized public safety and security, thus occasioning delayed response of law enforcement agencies to terrorist attacks and other criminal activities.

Equally, during the Saba Saba and 25th June, 2025 demonstrations, criminals targeted critical infrastructure. As a result, National and County Government offices/ premises were burnt down, police stations/posts vandalized or set ablaze, firearms stolen and Government motor vehicles damaged.

The following measures have been taken to secure critical Government infrastructure:

- a) Enhanced security and surveillance of key installations;
- b) Proactive efforts to reduce crime rates, especially in areas previously prone to high levels of theft and break-in;
- c) Enhanced intelligence-led operations which culminated in arrests and prosecution of suspects;
- d) Risk assessment to identify vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure and implementation of the outcome; and

- e) Enhanced collaboration with members of public to mitigate threats to critical infrastructure.

Challenges in securing critical Government infrastructure during the review period included inadequate physical security measures in some Government installations such as lack of perimeter walls which predispose them to breaches, and lack of modern security and surveillance systems; as well as poor network connectivity in some areas, which limits security responses and reporting.

Going forward, the Government intends to:

- a) Fast-track the enactment of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Bill;
- b) Replace and/or repair vandalized infrastructure;
- c) Continuously engage stakeholders to enhance physical security measures by improving surveillance and monitoring through installation of security enablers; and
- d) Enhance the operational capacity of security agencies to ensure efficient protection of critical infrastructure.

1.11 REFUGEES

Kenya currently hosts about 850,000 refugees and asylum seekers in Dadaab and Kakuma camps as well as urban areas such as Nairobi, Mombasa and Nakuru, making it the largest refugee-hosting country in Africa. Majority of refugees and asylum seekers are from Somalia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi. The presence of refugees and asylum seekers in the country continued to pose security risks, including the spill-over of conflicts from countries of origin, infiltration by Al-Shabaab and arms trafficking, as well as contraband and human smuggling. Additionally, tension between the host communities and refugees over competition for resources including limited economic opportunities persisted.

During the period under review, there was a considerable increase in the number of asylum seekers within the designated refugee camps, owing to instability in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions. As such, the refugee population increased from 750,000 in August, 2024 to 850,000 by August, 2025. This came amidst the reduction of funding to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which significantly disrupted food distribution, water and health services in the refugee camps.

In response to the protracted refugee situation, the following mitigation strategies were adopted during the period under review:

- a) Legislative reforms, including operationalization of the Refugee Act of 2021, which grants refugees legal identification, the right to work, freedom of movement within designated areas and access to national services;
- b) Rolled out the Shirika Integration Plan, which envisions transforming refugee camps into self-sustaining ecosystems;
- c) Sustained intelligence-led multi-agency operations to counter nefarious activities by terrorist groups within refugee camps;
- d) Reinforced the security environment in the refugee camps and surrounding host community areas through enhanced police presence and community policing initiatives; and
- e) Enhanced resource allocation to the Department of Refugee Services (DRS) for effective management of refugee affairs in the country.

The following challenges were witnessed during the review period:

- a) Instability in neighboring countries, which continued to occasion the steady inflow of refugees into the country;
- b) Exploitation by terrorists and other criminal elements' of the growing refugee population to infiltrate refugee camps;
- c) Continued opposition to Government initiatives, such as the Shirika Integration Plan by some stakeholders such as politicians, refugees and host communities; and
- d) Sustained activities of transnational organized crime syndicates involved in contraband and human smuggling and arms trafficking in the refugee camps.

Going forward, the Government is committed to:

- a) Sustaining collaboration with key stakeholders, including donor agencies, refugee-led organizations and host communities to address emerging issues;
- b) Enhancing of multi-agency framework by security agencies to counter threats within the refugee camps;

- c) Leveraging bilateral and multi-lateral engagements to address political instability in the region;
- d) Addressing capacity constraints within the Department of Refugee Services for effective governance of refugee affairs in the country; and
- e) Developing an interoperable refugee database for effective planning and resource allocation.

1.12 CATTLE RUSTLING AND STOCK THEFT

Cattle rustling and stock theft persisted in various parts of the country, mainly in the North Rift, Upper Eastern and parts of Northern Kenya. These criminal activities are often rooted in historical conflicts, ethnic rivalries, competition for natural resources, commercialization of cattle theft as well as climate-induced migrations in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs).

Over time, cattle rustling has evolved into organized crime driven by cross border networks trafficking in illicit firearms and other contraband goods and the practice of cyclic revenge attacks by the concerned communities. Additionally, collusion by sections of the political leadership in the affected areas has exacerbated cattle rustling and inter-communal tension in parts of the country. Proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons has continued to fuel cattle rustling and targeting of security personnel, leading to loss of lives, displacement of persons, destruction of property and disruption of social and economic activities.

The period under review saw a notable decrease in the number of raids from **845** in September, 2023 to August, 2024 to **673** in September, 2024 to August, 2025. This shows great improvement on the efforts employed by the security agencies in the areas gazetted as “disturbed and dangerous.” The number of cattle stolen reduced from 30, 532 heads of cattle in 2023/2024 to 20,308 in a similar period in 2024/2025 translating to a 33.5% drop. Additionally, there was also a 15.7 per cent drop in the number of livestock recovered from 13,876 in 2023/2024 to 11,704 in September, 2024 to August, 2025. This is summarised in Table 1.6.

Table 1.6: Comparative summary of Number of Livestock stolen during the periods

	SEPT., 2023- AUG., 2024	SEPT., 2024- AUG., 2025	VAR	%CHANGE
Raids	845	673	-172	-20.4
Livestock stolen	30,532	20,308	-10,224	-33.5
Livestock recovered	13,876	11,704	-2,172	-15.7

Further, a total of **93** persons were killed whereas **71** others sustained injuries as a result of the banditry attacks. Police officers arrested a total of **288** suspects representing **37.8%** increase in the number of suspects arrested compared to a similar period in 2023/2024 as shown in Table 1.7.

Table 1.7: Summary of Number of persons killed, injured and those suspects arrested over livestock theft

PERSONS	SEPT., 2023- AUG., 2024	SEPT., 2024- AUG., 2025	VAR	%CHANGE
Persons Killed	84	93	9	10.7
Persons Injured	65	71	6	9.2
Suspects Arrested	209	288	79	37.8

From a County perspective, Counties in Rift Valley witnessed the highest number of Livestock theft. Turkana and Laikipia Counties had the highest number of livestock stolen at 3391 and 3058 respectively. A County summary analysis of livestock theft is presented in **Annex II.**

The following measures have been implemented to contain banditry and cattle rustling in the country:

- a) Enhanced deployment of specialized security units such as the Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) and Rapid Deployment Units (RDU) and enlistment of National Police Reservists (NPRs) for rapid response and deterrence;
- b) Enhanced and joint disarmament exercises have periodically been carried out to reduce illegal firearms among civilians;
- c) Strengthened multi-agency operations in banditry prone areas under the Operation Maliza Uhalifu 2 (OMU 2) Framework leading to a significant reduction in the vice;

- d) Continuous co-operation with the local communities, peace committees and non-state actors to promote peace-building and alternative dispute resolution initiatives in the affected areas; and
- e) Rolled out infrastructure development initiatives and rehabilitation of 16 schools to open up the areas and encourage settlement by local communities.

Despite these efforts, several challenges persist. These include:

- a) Harsh terrain and poor infrastructure, which hinder rapid response by security forces;
- b) Deep-rooted mistrust between communities and law enforcement agencies, and politicization of security issues;
- c) Retrogressive cultural practices amongst pastoralist communities, coupled with limited socio-economic opportunities, which fuel youth involvement in banditry and rustling as an alternative livelihood; and
- d) Proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons, as well as adverse effects of climate change, which continues to heighten competition for resources and fuel invasions.

To effectively combat banditry and cattle rustling, the Government will:

- a) Sustain peace initiatives, inter-community dialogue and reintegration of reformed rustlers and bandits;
- b) Upgrade equipment for law enforcement personnel to adopt to the harsh terrain;
- c) Sustain cross-border co-operation with neighboring countries to dismantle transnational cattle theft networks;
- d) Monitoring livestock movements and markets;
- e) Promoting climate-smart livestock development and affordable insurance schemes; and
- f) Address inter-community land boundary-related conflicts and disputes.

1.13 INTER-COMMUNAL CONFLICTS AND BOUNDARY DISPUTES

Conflict amongst communities remained a source of insecurity during the period under review. These conflicts were driven by competition over natural resources such as land, water, pasture, minerals and fishing grounds. The competition was compounded by adverse

effects of climate change which occasioned drought, leading to disputes among pastoralist communities over grazing fields and water points. The conflicts over resources undermined peaceful co-existence amongst communities, especially in parts North Rift, Upper Eastern and North Eastern regions.

The clamor for redress of historical injustices and growing use of violence to assert ownership and control over use of land and shared resources, as well as boundary disputes, exacerbated intra-and inter-communal conflicts across the country. In agriculturally rich regions, land ownership disputes, often tied to irregular land allocations, led to violent confrontations and displacement of populations. The situation was worsened by delayed adjudication of disputed areas, political incitement and mineral prospecting along contested inter-county boundaries

For instance, inter-county boundary disputes fueled conflict, particularly along the Narok-Migori, Meru-Tharaka Nithi, Kisii-Nyamira, Turkana-Baringo, Turkana-West Pokot, Garissa-Tana River and Tana River-Kitui counties. Equally, violent conflict pitting squatters and private land owners persisted in Kilifi, Kwale, Machakos, Nakuru, Nandi, Kericho and Bomet counties.

Similarly, there were inter-clan conflicts over political supremacy in the North Eastern Region.

Table 1.8 presents the summary of numbers of Ethnic Conflict during the reporting period.

Table 1.8: Summary of numbers of Ethnic Conflict

Region	No. of cases	Victims	
		Killed	Injured
Coast	14	26	17
North Eastern	7	10	7
Eastern	0	0	0
Central	0	0	0
Rift Valley	19	36	36
Western	0	0	0
Nyanza	0	0	0
Nairobi	0	0	0
Total	40	72	60

The following measures have been taken to address the intermittent conflicts:

- a) Establishment of new administrative units, deployment of security personnel and National Government Administrative Officers (NGAOs) in identified hotspots to enhance Government presence in affected areas;
- b) Engagement with local leaders and community elders in peace-building dialogue fora to address the conflicts;
- c) Land adjudication and issuance of title deeds, as well as investigations to address protracted land disputes;
- d) Implementation of the Shared National Security Strategy for the Restoration of Peace and Security in the North Rift Region and Operation Maliza Uhalifu;
- e) Sustained alternative dispute resolution mechanism to augment security operations and promote peaceful co-existence; and
- f) Ongoing community policing initiatives in conflict-prone counties.

Challenges faced by the Government in containing inter-communal conflict include:

- a) Deep-rooted communal rivalries exacerbated by political interests and historical grievances;
- b) Inadequate policy frameworks for long-term conflict resolution and resource sharing; and
- c) Delays in resolution of protracted boundary disputes.

To mitigate the threat, the Government is committed to:

- a) Enhance investment in peace-building programmes, conflict mediation and civic education in affected regions;
- b) Initiate a targeted efforts amongst stakeholders in the affected regions on cohesion and roll out of joint disarmament exercises; and
- c) Fast-track infrastructure development programmes to open up the affected regions.

1.14 ILLICIT SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) pose a significant threat to national security, socio-economic progress and regional stability. As a regional hub, Kenya faced challenges from cross-border arms trafficking linked to conflicts in the Great Lakes, Horn of Africa and the East African region. Transnational arms trafficking cartels continued to capitalize on the instability in the region to acquire illicit arms and ammunition for supply to trafficking networks in Kenya through the porous borders. The main arms supply routes used by traffickers include; Uganda-West Pokot; Tanzania-Migori; Somalia-Mandera-Marsabit-Isiolo; and Ethiopia-Marsabit-Isiolo-Meru-Nairobi.

Similarly, some politicians and local business owners continued to covertly facilitate their communities to acquire illicit arms for offensive and defensive purposes. Further, criminal gangs have continued to acquire homemade guns and source for illicit arms from local gun runners, which they use to perpetrate crime, especially in urban areas. The vice was rampant in border areas within the North Rift, North Eastern and parts of the Coast regions, with the most trafficked illicit arms being pistols and AK47 rifles.

Table 1.9 below shows illicit SALW recovered:

Table 1.9: Number of Illicit SALW Recovered

Category	Sept., 2023 – Aug., 2024	Sept., 2024 – Aug., 2025	Var	% Var
Firearms	153	87	-66	-43
Explosives	42	8	-34	-81
Ammunition	7,881	1,059	-6,822	-87
Magazine	37	30	-7	-19
Total	8,113	1,184	-6,929	-85

The following measures have been taken to address the menace:

- a) The Government destroyed 1,792 illegal firearms in Ngong, Kajiado County on 13th June, 2025;
- b) Continued voluntary disarmament operations focused on the recovery of illicit firearms and ammunition led to recovery of 87 illicit firearms, 8 explosive devices, 1059 ammunition and 30 magazines;

- c) Intelligence operations were enhanced in regions with a high concentration of illicit SALWs to identify and dismantle arms trafficking networks;
- d) Strengthened border controls to prevent the proliferation of arms across porous borders; and,
- e) Arrest and prosecution of persons in possession of illicit arms and politicians abetting illegal acquisition of arms by communities.

Challenges in addressing the proliferation of illicit SALW include:

- a) Politicization of disarmament operations;
- b) Ease of access of illegal firearms, especially from some unstable neighboring countries;
- c) Porosity of the borders enables traffickers to easily move firearms into the country; and
- d) Existence of arms trafficking networks exploiting State fragility in parts of the Region.

Going forward, the Government is committing to:

- a) Expand community policing efforts and increase public sensitization campaigns to raise awareness about the dangers of illicit SALWs;
- b) Invest in modern arms tracing technology to track and seize illicit firearms more effectively;
- c) Enforce penalties for those involved in the illegal trade and possession of firearms and explosives;
- d) Strengthen inter-state collaboration to address cross-border trafficking of arms;
- e) Continued joint targeted disarmament programmes in affected areas; and
- f) Supporting strategies towards stabilizing the Horn of Africa to curtail the availability of illegal firearms and ammunition.

1.15 CROSS BORDER INCURSIONS

Border security remains a critical component of national security, given the country's strategic location and its shared boundaries. Kenya's expansive porous borders presented

numerous challenges, including infiltration by terrorists, spillover of instability from some neighboring countries, cross-border banditry, smuggling of illicit goods and firearms, human trafficking and illegal immigration. During the period under review, cross-border incursions by armed militia and foreign security forces undermined security along Kenya's border with Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia.

In particular, the eastern border with Somalia faced frequent incursions by Al-Shabaab militants while the northwestern border with South Sudan and Ethiopia witnessed cross-border pastoralist conflicts. Similarly, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and Tabaqa forces made incursions into Kenya's territory along the Kenya-Ethiopia border in Marsabit County. Separately, on 22nd February, 2025, suspected Dassenach militants from Ethiopia ambushed and attacked fishermen in Lake Turkana within Todonyang, killing over twenty (20) people and seizing fishing gear. Equally, Toposa militia from South Sudan made incursions into parts of Turkana County.

Cross-border security dynamics along the Kenya-Uganda border were characterized by persistent conflicts among pastoral communities. However, efforts such as the Acholi-Turkana-Karamojong-Etton-Kenyan-Ethiopian Region (ATEKER) Peace Initiative have made notable progress in fostering dialogue and reducing violence. The cross-border incursions were fueled by disputed boundaries, porosity of the borders, availability of illicit firearms and competition for pasture and water.

The Government has taken a multi-pronged approach to address cross-border incursions, including:

- a) Enhanced deployment of multi-agency security teams to secure border zones and the Border Sea Operation Team (BORSOPT) in coastal and lake regions;
- b) Development of border infrastructure, including security roads, Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and border control posts;
- c) Introduction of the e-Border Management System under the Integrated Border Management Strategy to improve surveillance and regulate movement at designated border points;
- d) Sustaining *Operation Ondoa Jangili* targeting OLA, leading to seizure of firearms, ammunition, counterfeit currency, Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)-making materials, medical supplies and unregistered motorcycles;

- e) Community engagement through local elders, religious leaders and peace committees to identify early warning signs and strengthen reporting of suspicious activities; and
- f) Strengthening of regional security cooperation through joint patrols and intelligence sharing in pastoralist areas.

Challenges affecting efforts to curb cross-border incursions include:

- a) Vast and porous borders with neighboring countries facing consequences of State fragility, leading to conflict spillovers and incursions by armed pastoralists;
- b) Difficult terrain limiting movement of security personnel for effective surveillance and enforcement; and
- c) Refugee inflows, with some criminals exploiting the situation to enter Kenya, disguised as asylum seekers.

Going forward, the Government is committed to:

- a) Expand maritime security coverage through the acquisition of additional patrol vessels;
- b) Sustain specialized training programmes for border security personnel;
- c) Increase the number of forward operating bases at strategic border locations;
- d) Boost operational funding to support surveillance, enforcement and technology improvements; and
- e) Enhance inter-agency coordination and information sharing among border security agencies.

1.16 MARITIME SECURITY

Kenya's maritime domain remains vulnerable to a range of security threats. The reporting period was marked by increased incidents of Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported (IUU) fishing; maritime trade disruption and a resurgence of piracy; and inland water security incidents. These challenges not only undermine national security, but also threaten economic stability and regional maritime governance.

The re-emergence of piracy and armed attacks at sea, partly linked to the Middle East security crises and reduced naval presence in key sea lanes has disrupted maritime trade

along the Western Indian Ocean. These developments, attributed to Houthi-instigated instability, have increased the cost of shipping, inflating the price of goods and services, with adverse implications on Kenya's economy.

IUU fishing by both foreign and domestic vessels continues to deplete fish stocks and damage marine ecosystems. Non-compliance with landing regulations and the use of destructive gear, further diminish Kenya's fisheries revenue and employment opportunities. Additionally, climate change-related impacts, such as rising sea levels, marine pollution, and habitat degradation, have compounded ecological stress across marine and inland water bodies.

In Lake Turkana, violent clashes occurred on 22nd February, 2025, between armed Dassenach fishermen from Ethiopia and Kenyan fishers, reflecting longstanding tensions in the Omo Delta. On Lake Victoria, Kenyan fishermen have continued to face arrests and seizure of gear by Ugandan and Tanzanian authorities.

Uganda's ban on scoop nets in early 2024, triggered the migration of artisanal fishers into Kenya, most of whom lacked legal documentation, raising security and regulatory concerns in Busia and Siaya Counties.

To address maritime security threats during the reporting period, the Government undertook coordinated interventions to enhance enforcement, regulatory compliance and maritime domain awareness, including:

- a) Deployment of security patrol vessels in marine waters and Lakes Turkana, Naivasha and Victoria;
- b) Training Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance officers and upgrading the Vessel Monitoring System in Mombasa;
- c) Establishment of an Inter-Agency Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) Unit;
- d) Developing eight (8) Fisheries Regulations to strengthen conservation and management and implemented the Fisheries (Beach Management Units) Regulations 2024;
- e) Enforced regulations on active CCTV systems on commercial fishing vessels; and
- f) Strengthened international and regional fisheries governance through implementation of the Port State Measures Agreement.

Despite ongoing efforts, the following constraints continue to impede effective maritime and fisheries security operations:

- a) Inadequate border controls;
- b) Inadequacies of coordinated management structures for transboundary water bodies;
- c) Gaps in law enforcement and limited prosecution of fisheries-related offences; and
- d) Limited regional commitment to existing fisheries agreements, including harmonized licensing regimes.

To address these challenges, the Government undertakes to:

- a) Strengthen institutional and legal frameworks by enhancing enforcement capacity, improving prosecution mechanisms and finalizing supporting regulations;
- b) Enhance border management by scaling up resource allocation for MCS units;
- c) Advance regional and cross-border cooperation on joint management of shared water bodies and revitalizing commitments to harmonized fisheries regimes; and
- d) Promote climate resilience and secure technologies by investing in secure data systems, including cybersecurity training for maritime personnel.

1.18 PUBLIC HEALTH SECURITY

Health security is a critical national security concern underpinning the physical wellbeing of the citizenry and the country's economic development. Kenya remains committed to safeguard health security through improving service delivery, reducing the incidences of communicable diseases and mitigating emerging health risks, in line with the Constitution of Kenya, Vision 2030, BETA as well as regional and global commitments.

During the review period, the health sector grappled with occasional shortage of essential drugs and equipment, incessant labor unrests, residual transitional hurdles in implementation of SHA, impact of pandemics and epidemics as well as declining external funding, which undermined effective provision of health services across the country.

1.18.1 UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE

The rollout of the Social Health Insurance Fund (SHIF) encountered implementation hurdles arising from institutional and fiscal challenges. Concerns around the sustainability of the

SHIF financing model were amplified by fluctuating resource flows and mixed public perceptions regarding the adequacy of the benefits package. Additionally, stakeholder apprehension, particularly from segments within the health sector, reflected the need for broader consensus-building and resolution of legacy issues related to entitlements and contributions.

To mitigate these threats and support the implementation of SHIF, the Government took the following measures:

- a) Enhanced the benefits package under the critical and chronic care fund, including oncology services;
- b) Trained and deployed NGAOs to raise public awareness on SHIF;
- c) Sustained stakeholder engagement efforts to address longstanding concerns and foster public buy-in; and
- d) Investigated and prosecuted owners of health facilities accused of fraudulent claims.

Despite these efforts, the following challenges continued to impede progress:

- a) Perceived concerns by sections of the population over the long-term sustainability of the SHIF financing model;
- b) Issues raised by healthcare providers requiring further engagement;
- c) Limited uptake among informal sector contributors, underscoring the need for targeted sensitization;
- d) Perceptions of inadequacy in the current benefits package relative to contributions;
- e) Ongoing resource limitations affecting the operational capacity of KEMSA; and
- f) Emerging risks linked to reduced external funding commitments.

To strengthen SHIF implementation and public confidence, the Government is committed to:

- a) Developing mechanisms to sustain the Scheme, including a review of the capitation model and renegotiation of provider packages;
- b) Investing in user-friendly digital infrastructure to streamline data management and reduce system failures; and

- c) Intensifying public sensitization on SHIF benefits and healthcare facility categorization.

1.18.2 PUBLIC HEALTH EPIDEMICS

During the reporting period, Kenya experienced multiple public health emergencies, highlighting the scale and complexity of emerging threats. Turkana County had the highest reported cases of cholera (124), Mombasa leading in number of Mpox cases at 173. Notably, the country had a case of Polio in Marsabit. The summary of epidemic cases is presented in Table 1.10.

Table 1.10: Reported Cases of Epidemics

S/No.	Public Health emergency threats	Affected Counties	Number of confirmed cases
1.	Cholera	7 Counties (Turkana (124), Migori (53), Nairobi, Kisumu (99), and Kwale (48), Mombasa (32), Garissa (1).	426
2.	Mpox	24 counties (Mombasa (173), Busia (64), Nairobi (39), Makueni (23), Nakuru (22), Kilifi (22), Uasin Gishu (9), Kiambu (9), Bungoma (5), Taita Taveta (5), Machakos (5), Trans Nzoia (4), Kajiado (4), Kakamega (3), Kericho (3), Nyeri (3), Migori (1), Kisii (1), Kirinyaga (1), Isiolo (1), Kitui (1), Narok (1), Baringo (1), and Murang'a (1)	401
3.	Visceral Leishmaniasis	Wajir, Marsabit, West Pokot and Mandera Counties.	1900
4.	Polio (cVDPV2)	Marsabit	1
5.	Measles	18- Counties (Garissa, Isiolo, Kajiado, Kilifi, Kitui, Mandera, Marsabit, Mombasa, Nairobi, Nakuru, Samburu, Turkana, Uasin Gishu, Wajir, Meru, Laikipia, West Pokot and Narok)	464
6.	Anthrax	Vihiga	5

There was heightened risk of importation of viral hemorrhagic fevers, including Ebola and Marburg, from outbreaks in Uganda and Tanzania, as well as cross-border spread of cVDPV2. The Ministry of Health maintained vigilance to prevent and respond to such threats.

To strengthen health security and emergency preparedness, the Government implemented the following key interventions during the reporting period:

- a) Launched the Kenya National Public Health Institute (KNPHI) in May 2025 and developed the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) following the Joint External Evaluation (JEE);
- b) Distributed disease surveillance vehicles to all 47 counties and trained 250 public health officers and over 100,000 community health promoters;
- c) Upgraded 11 laboratories in ASAL counties to ISO standards and conducted Ebola readiness drills at JKIA;
- d) Deployed Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) to support outbreak management, diagnostics, and risk communication;
- e) Initiated Mpox and Leishmaniasis vaccination planning and conducted two rounds of polio vaccination with trained personnel; and
- f) Enhanced surveillance at points of entry, activated Incident Management Systems, and improved cross-border co-ordination.

Despite the progress made, the following challenges constrained the effectiveness of health security measures:

- a) Inadequate domestic health financing and reduced support from development partners;
- b) Shortage of trained public health personnel;
- c) Climate-related shifts, which affect disease dynamics;
- d) Misinformation that is undermining public engagement and cooperation; and
- e) Persistent industrial actions by health workers, which disrupted service delivery.

To address these gaps and enhance health system resilience, the Government is committed to:

- a) Sustaining and expanding sectoral funding through alternative financing mechanisms;
- b) Strengthening public risk communication and community-level health awareness; and
- c) Enhancing cross-border surveillance and regional co-ordination frameworks.

1.19 BIOSECURITY

Zoonotic diseases such as anthrax and rabies remain serious biosecurity threats due to their potential impact on public health, the economy and national security. The Government continues to strengthen biosecurity strategies through the One Health approach, fostering close collaboration between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development.

To mitigate biosecurity risks and enhance disease control, the Government implemented the following measures:

- a) Continued implementation of the National Strategy for Prevention and Control of Anthrax (2021–2036);
- b) Maintained livestock Disease-Free Zones and strengthened disease surveillance;
- c) Completed construction of the Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory at Kabete;
- d) Trained personnel and equipped veterinary laboratories;
- e) Enforced strict biosafety protocols for handling biological agents; and
- f) Enhanced multi-agency collaboration in surveillance and response.

Despite progress, the following challenges persist:

- a) Encroachment and illegal acquisition of land earmarked for quarantine facilities;
- b) Limited public awareness on biosecurity threats; and
- c) Inadequate screening capacity for biological hazards.

To address emerging biosecurity gaps, the Government is committed to strengthening multi-agency co-ordination to safeguard critical veterinary infrastructure and increasing budgetary allocation to support biosecurity systems and response capacity.

1.20 WILDLIFE SECURITY

Kenya's wildlife remains a strategic national asset, supporting tourism, foreign exchange and community livelihoods. However, it continues to face persistent threats, including poaching, bush meat trafficking, human-wildlife conflict and habitat degradation. These challenges undermine conservation efforts and pose risks to national security, especially in rural areas where communities depend directly on natural ecosystems for survival.

During the reporting period, poaching of wildlife for trophies and bush meat, particularly giraffes, dik-diks, buffaloes, gazelles and zebras, remained an issue of concern.

To counter escalating threats and promote sustainable conservation, the Government implemented the following measures:

- a) Reviewed and strengthened the legal and policy frameworks, by enacting Wildlife Conservation and Management (Amendment) Act, 2025;
- b) Deployed technology such as Earth Ranger and integrated SMART and LORA tools;
- c) Conducted intelligence-led anti-poaching operations, recovering 6,214kg ivory, 96kg rhino horn, 13,837kg bush meat, and other critical species;
- d) Sustained multi-agency collaboration at national and cross-border levels;
- e) Enhanced enforcement capacity through the recruitment, training and deployment of 1,274 rangers from the KWS Law Enforcement Academy in December, 2024;
- f) Strengthened engagements with community conservancies and other collaborative efforts with communities hosting wildlife to enhance wildlife security measures through community level conservation initiatives. This include the ongoing phased transfer of Amboseli National Park to Kajiado County Government;
- g) Initiated reforms to fast-track compensation for human-wildlife conflict victims, enhancing transparency and responsiveness; and
- h) Arrested and prosecuted 1,798 offenders.

Despite progress, the following challenges impeded wildlife protection efforts:

- a) Limited and unsustainable funding for mitigation programmes and conservation initiatives;
- b) Continued encroachment on migratory corridors;
- c) Climate-induced resource pressures, which are increasing the frequency of human-wildlife conflict;
- d) Sophisticated wildlife crime syndicates exploiting border gaps and enforcement weaknesses;

- e) Slow adoption of modern technologies due to financial, infrastructural and expertise constraints; and
- f) Delays in compensation payments, fueling community resentment and retaliatory killings.

To safeguard wildlife and strengthen conservation security, the Government will:

- a) Intensify border and port controls to disrupt trafficking routes and apprehend offenders;
- b) Deepen cross-border collaboration through bilateral agreements and harmonized enforcement;
- c) Promote adaptive land-use planning by securing wildlife corridors;
- d) Scale up community-led deterrent initiatives and alternative livelihood programmes to reduce conflict drivers; and
- e) Improve compensation mechanisms for Human-Wildlife Conflict (HWC) victims and explore scalable financing solutions leveraging tourism and climate finance.

1.21 AVIATION SECURITY

Aviation security remains a vital component of Kenya's national security priorities, given the country's status as a regional air transport hub. Emerging threats, ranging from Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), environmental pressures and civilian encroachment have increased the complexity of maintaining secure and efficient airspace. These challenges are compounded by evolving technologies, resource limitations and gaps in inter-agency coordination, necessitating need for a multi-layered regulatory and operational response.

To safeguard the national airspace and align with international standards, the following measures were implemented:

- a) Developed the Civil Aviation (Security) Regulations 2024, in compliance with ICAO standards;
- b) Operationalized the National Aviation Safety Plan (2023–2025);
- c) Updated the regulatory framework for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to manage the increasing civilian use of drones;

- d) Hosted the 4th Safe Skies Forum in 2025, facilitating dialogue and information exchange on aviation security in conflict-prone regions;
- e) Multi-agency initiatives to manage bird hazards through radar systems and habitat control; and
- f) KCAA continues to build capacity and aviation security awareness through targeted training programmes.

Despite institutional progress, the aviation sector continues to face the following security risks:

- a) Persistent risk of bird strikes, especially at JKIA and Kisumu airports;
- b) Aviation pollution and limited real-time data on emissions and noise harm to the environment;
- c) The proliferation of civilian-operated drones near critical infrastructure; and
- d) Encroachment on military airbases and civilian airports that undermine safety, violates Obstacle Limitation Surfaces (OLS), and complicates operational planning.

To mitigate these threats and reinforce aviation safety and resilience, the Government will:

- a) Advance the sustainable aviation agenda through the ICAO ACT-SAF programme, supported by feasibility studies conducted with international partners;
- b) Strengthen joint efforts by KDF, KCAA, NEMA, National Construction Authority (NCA) and National Land Commission (NLC), to address encroachment on aviation infrastructure and enforce compliance with safety zones;
- c) Support the joint KDF–KCAA task force to integrate CIMIC protocols and fast-track enforcement of Obstacle Limitation Surfaces (OLS) compliance and encroachment mitigation;
- d) Strengthen enforcement of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) regulations through mandatory geofencing and targeted drone use awareness campaigns;
- e) Accelerate adoption of Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAF) under the ICAO ACT-SAF programme and scale partnerships with NEMA for bird strike prevention and airspace safety; and

- f) Upgrade flood-prone infrastructure at high-risk airports, particularly in the Lake Victoria Basin.

1.22 NATURAL RESOURCE SECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE

1.22.1 Natural Resource Security

Kenya's natural resources, including land, forests, water bodies, minerals, wildlife, and renewable energy, are foundational to the country's socio-economic transformation, environmental sustainability, and national security. However, unsustainable exploitation, weak governance structures and rising insecurity have heightened resource-based tensions, disrupted livelihoods and eroded long-term development gains. In recent years, critical minerals and green energy resources have attracted speculative interest, intensifying pressure on the sector and exposing regulatory gaps that transnational criminal networks have exploited.

Given the multidimensional nature of these resources and the increasing risks involved in their management and use, a more detailed analysis across key thematic areas is necessary. The following sub-sections outline the status, vulnerabilities and strategic considerations related to Kenya's land and ecosystems, forests, water, fisheries, wildlife, extractives and renewable energy sectors.

Land and ecosystems. Land is the primary source of livelihood for the majority of Kenyans and underpins national development through agriculture, mining, infrastructure and tourism. However, rapid urbanization, poor spatial planning and encroachment into ecologically fragile areas have led to land degradation, habitat loss and increased conflict. Weak enforcement of land-use policies and unregulated settlements, especially near water catchments and conservation zones, continue to undermine resource governance.

Forests and Biodiversity. Forests are vital for climate regulation, carbon sequestration, and biodiversity conservation. Yet, illegal logging, infrastructure development and weak community forest governance structures have contributed to rapid deforestation and ecosystem fragmentation. This threatens not only biodiversity but also water catchments and local livelihoods dependent on forest products. To mitigate, the Government has among many other initiatives, continued to pursue the target of 15 billion tree cover by 2032. During the period under review, a total of **517,784,487 trees** were planted across various regions and institutions in Kenya. This is summarized in Table 1.11.

Table 1.11: Number of Trees grown under the 15 billion trees initiative

S/NO.	MONTH	NUMBER OF TREES PLANTED
1.	September, 2024	75,990,076
2.	October, 2024	178,902,734
3.	November, 2024	52,644,398
4.	December, 2024	34,143,174
5.	January, 2025	5,063,855
6.	February, 2025	55,615,046
7.	March, 2025	46,418,662
8.	April, 2025	18,442,706
9.	May, 2025	15,710,261
10.	June, 2025	12,466,734
11.	July, 2025	6,284,441
12.	August 2025	15,277,409
TOTAL		517,784,487

Water resources. Kenya’s rivers, lakes, and aquifers are central to agriculture, energy, industry, and domestic use. However, climate change, pollution, deforestation, and poor water-use regulation have caused rising water scarcity in many regions. Unsustainable extraction, coupled with weak enforcement of catchment protection measures, has intensified competition and conflict over water access, particularly in ASALs and shared basins.

Fisheries and marine ecosystems. Fisheries are key to food security and economic stability for communities near inland and coastal waters. However, overfishing, pollution and illegal practices have damaged aquatic ecosystems. Climate-induced changes in fish populations, coupled with insufficient enforcement, continue to threaten the sustainability of the sector.

Wildlife and conservation areas. Wildlife remains integral to Kenya’s global tourism appeal and rural economies. Nonetheless, habitat encroachment, poaching, and human-wildlife conflict persist. Uncoordinated development in migratory corridors, retaliatory killings and

inadequate benefit-sharing mechanisms have strained relations between communities and conservation actors, increasing security risks.

Minerals and Extractives. While the extractive sector holds significant economic potential, it has also been linked to environmental degradation, safety incidents and social conflict. Unregulated artisanal mining has caused fatalities, while tension between communities and mining companies over benefit-sharing and displacement, continues to undermine trust and local stability. The March 2024 mining moratorium in Marsabit County underscored the urgency of instituting better regulatory oversight.

Renewable energy. Kenya is a continental leader in geothermal, solar, and wind energy. However, the transition to renewable energy is constrained by limited grid infrastructure, upfront investment costs and fragmented policy implementation. Additionally, competition over land for energy installations has in some areas triggered local disputes and environmental concerns.

To safeguard natural resources and mitigate associated security threats, the Government has undertaken the following key interventions:

- a) Initiated the formulation of a Sessional Paper on Management, Exploitation, and Security of Kenya's natural resources, to streamline oversight of natural resource management;
- b) Strengthened inter-agency coordination frameworks between ministries, agencies, counties, and local communities, especially in conflict-prone areas;
- c) Promoted community-based natural resource management and participatory conservation to strengthen local governance and enhance benefit-sharing;
- d) Supported the management of Livestock Disease-Free Zones and enforced environmental impact assessments in extractive sectors;
- e) Initiated awareness campaigns on the social and environmental impacts of unsustainable exploitation; and
- f) Deployed traditional justice and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in line with Article 159 to resolve resource-based disputes.

Despite these efforts, the following challenges continue to compromise the sustainable governance and security of Kenya's natural resources:

- a) Inadequate coordination and duplication of mandates among national and county Government agencies;
- b) Recurrent inter-communal and cross-border conflicts over land and water resources, particularly in ASAL regions and shared basins like Lake Turkana and Mara River;
- c) Inadequate enforcement of legal frameworks, including the Mining Act, Forest Act and Water Act;
- d) Criminal networks involved in poaching, illegal logging and illicit mining operations, leading to loss of lives and revenue;
- e) Social contestation and mistrust in mining areas due to limited community involvement in decision-making and inequitable benefit-sharing; and
- f) Environmental degradation linked to deforestation, pollution, habitat loss and climate-induced pressures such as drought and resource scarcity.

To improve governance, safeguard integrity of natural resources and mitigate conflict, the Government is prioritizing the following:

- a) Streamlining and harmonizing mandates of environmental and conservation agencies while strengthening County Natural Resource Management Committees (CNRMCs);
- b) Enhancing enforcement of existing legal instruments, including the Mining Act, Water Act and Community Land Act;
- c) Deploying specialized security units to high-risk extraction and conservation zones, based on risk assessment;
- d) Promoting inclusive community engagement and equitable benefit-sharing in mining, wildlife and forestry sectors to build trust and reduce conflict triggers;
- e) Leveraging geospatial and digital tools for real-time monitoring, compliance tracking and licensing in key sectors such as forestry, mining and water; and
- f) Enhancing cross-border and international cooperation to manage shared natural resources, prevent transboundary conflicts and promote sustainable exploitation.

1.22.2 Climate Change

Climate change remains a complex and growing threat to Kenya's environmental security, affecting human health, food security, ecosystems and energy stability. The Government has implemented a mix of mitigation and adaptation strategies based on policy, legislation and strategic partnerships, including promoting a green energy transition, climate diplomacy and locally led actions to protect national security interests.

During the reporting period, irregular weather patterns characterized by delayed, below-average 2024 short rains and intense 2025 long rains were observed. The La Niña phenomenon caused high temperatures and reduced rainfall, especially impacting ASALs, with negative effects on food production and livelihoods. Conversely, above-normal rains led to flash floods and landslides in parts of Nairobi, Nyanza, Rift Valley and Central Regions, resulting in displacement, fatalities, infrastructure damage and outbreak of waterborne diseases. These events also heightened human-wildlife conflict, resource disputes and wildfires, further stressing fragile ecosystems.

Environmental degradation caused by illegal logging, unregulated mining, forest encroachment, poaching and pollution worsened the effects of climate change. These issues were compounded by weak enforcement, regulatory gaps and market-driven exploitation. However, the Government, working with development partners, continued to rally support for climate action and resilience efforts across key sectors.

To mitigate the effects of climate change and strengthen environmental security, the Government implemented the following interventions:

- a) Civic engagement campaigns were undertaken to raise awareness of climate-related hazards, alongside enhanced early warning systems and community sensitization;
- b) Tree planting drives were intensified by Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) during the long rains, supporting the 15 billion Tree Growing Initiative, alongside restoration of water towers and fencing of critical conservation areas;
- c) The National Disaster Risk Management Bill 2024 was passed by the Senate, with expected concurrence by the National Assembly;
- d) Partnerships were established to support clean energy transition and climate-smart technologies; and

- e) Implementation of the Financing Locally Led Climate Action Plan advanced across counties in partnership with the World Bank, alongside initiatives to promote artisanal mining licensing and responsible natural resource use.

Notwithstanding these efforts, the following challenges continue to hinder effective climate and environmental security responses:

- a) Limited public awareness and low community participation in climate adaptation and conservation;
- b) Inadequate climate financing and slow uptake of clean energy solutions;
- c) Inadequacies in responses to recurrent flooding in areas such as Isiolo, Lake Baringo environs and the Lake Victoria Basin;
- d) Governance and regulatory gaps that undermine ecosystem protection and equitable access to natural resources;
- e) Rising climate-related conflicts, including resistance to carbon credit projects due to concerns over land rights and benefit-sharing; and
- f) Capacity shortfalls in disaster response, including wildfire containment and flood rescue efforts.

To address these gaps, the Government will:

- a) Deepen community engagement in conservation, strengthen protection around carbon credit schemes and promote inclusive benefit-sharing;
- b) Scale-up production and dissemination of early warning systems while urging county Governments to allocate sufficient disaster response funding;
- c) Leverage existing climate finance partnerships to build technical and institutional capacity and pursue new funding streams with enhanced governance oversight;
- d) Accelerate implementation of national climate commitments, including transitioning to e-mobility, green manufacturing and climate-smart agriculture; and
- e) Promote youth leadership and green entrepreneurship in climate advocacy, innovation and sustainable technologies, while positioning Kenya as a leading voice in global climate negotiations.

1.23 ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GANGS

The country continued to face threats from organized criminal gangs mainly in urban areas and densely populated settlements. The gangs are largely composed of unemployed youths who are attracted to join criminal gangs for gain from illicit activities. During the period under review, the Government not only confronted this grim reality, but also endeavored to engage the youths in gainful and productive activities as well as discourage them from crime.

Generally, organized criminal gangs remains a threat to public safety, erodes economic progress and robs the youth of their future. Factors contributing to the rise of these gangs include unemployment, youthful truancy, substance abuse and unhelpful political patronage. Additionally, intensified political contests in parts of the country fueled enlistment of vulnerable youths into criminal gangs and amorphous goons by some politicians to counter their rivals, thus compounding the situation.

Organized crime networks and are involved in extortion, robberies, muggings, illegal oathing, cattle rustling, robbery, burglary, fraudulent land dealings, murder and drug peddling. They are also engaged in transnational crimes ranging from human trafficking, drug trafficking, smuggling of counterfeit and illicit products.

To exemplify these worrying trends, the year 2025 saw the emergence of a criminal gang christened as *Team Mbogi* that operate in urban and peri-urban area of Umoja within Nairobi County. Of concern, the gang members arrested were between the ages of 13 – 22 years signifying a trend of juvenile delinquency and involvement in criminal gangs.

From September, 2024 to August, 2025, a total of **602** cases were recorded compared to **721** cases recorded in a similar period from September 2023 to August 2024. This represented a decrease of **119** arrests or 16.5%. Table 1.12 shows the Comparative Criminal Gang Analysis for September, 2023 – August, 2024 and September, 2024 – August, 2025.

Table 1.12: Comparative Analysis of Criminal Gangs for September, 2023 – August, 2024 and September, 2024 – August, 2025

S/NO.	Criminal Gang	Arrested Persons		Diff	% Diff
		Sep., 2023 – Aug., 2024	Sep., 2024 – Aug., 2025		
1.	Panga Boys	84	466	382	454.76
2.	Organised	22	0	-22	-100
3.	Mutu Tatu Squad	5	0	-5	-100
4.	Marauding	1	0	-1	-100
5.	Mungiki	316	17	-299	-94.62
6.	Team Shamba	8	33	25	312.5
7.	Chafu	4	0	-4	-100
8.	MRC	4	0	-4	-100
9.	Usiku Sacco	11	0	-11	-100
10.	Gaza	11	0	-11	-100
11.	Good News International Ministries	94	0	-94	-100
12.	Kata Hema	14	0	-14	-100
13.	Nairobi	1	0	-1	-100
14.	Buggati	0	15	15	0
15.	Jeshi Jinga	0	18	18	0
16.	M23	0	3	3	0
17.	B13	0	8	8	0
18.	Maandani Bc	0	4	4	0
19.	Team Kiroro	0	7	7	0
20.	DNA	0	3	3	0
21.	Team Mbogi	0	14	14	0
TOTAL		721	602	-119	-16.51

To address the threat posed by criminal gangs, the Government undertook a series of co-ordinated and strategic interventions, including:

- a) Intelligence-led operations and sustained crackdown on gang members resulting in the arrest, prosecution and disruptions of their networks;
- b) Community policing and public sensitization efforts to encourage timely reporting of gang-related incidents and improve collaboration with law enforcement agencies;
- c) Engagement with local leadership and stakeholders to identify and address the root causes of gang recruitment, including socio-economic vulnerabilities;

- d) Implementation of youth empowerment and outreach programmes aimed at reducing the susceptibility of young people to gang enlistment through skills training and employment opportunities; and
- e) Strengthened accountability within security agencies, including stern disciplinary action against officers and individuals found abetting or participating in criminal activities.

Despite ongoing efforts, several persistent challenges continue to undermine the effectiveness of anti-gang interventions. These include:

- a) Re-emergence of criminal gangs under new identities and leadership structures, complicating curtailment efforts;
- b) Inadequate rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for reformed gang members, leading to high rates of recidivism;
- c) Community fear of retaliation from gangs, which discourages the public from reporting or sharing critical intelligence with authorities; and
- d) Limited alternative livelihood opportunities, especially for vulnerable youth, increasing their risk of recruitment by criminal gangs and networks.

Going forward, the Government remains committed to addressing the root causes and impact of gang-related crime through the following key measures:

- a) Strengthening community policing structures to foster trust, encourage public participation and improve collaboration with law enforcement agencies;
- b) Implementing long-term youth empowerment and employment initiatives to reduce vulnerability to recruitment and exploitation by criminal gangs;
- c) Enhancing rehabilitation and reintegration programmes to support former gang members in transitioning to productive and law-abiding lives;
- d) Intensifying co-ordinated multi-agency security operations against criminal gangs in parts of the country; and
- e) Intensifying the crackdown against drug trafficking syndicates, as well as the fight against illicit brews.

1.24 KIDNAPPING AND ABDUCTION

Kidnappings and abductions in Kenya has in the recent past become a growing security concern owing to its criminal nature. Criminals target various population groups including children, women and business persons with the vice manifesting itself as kidnapping for ransom demands and extortion, human trafficking and at times owing to business rivalry perpetuated by either strangers or acquaintances.

A regional comparative analysis of kidnappings between September, 2023 to August, 2024, and September, 2024 to August, 2025 is summarized in Table 1.13 below.

Table 1.13: Kidnappings Comparative Figures per Region

Region	Sept., 2023 to Aug., 2024	Sept., 2024 to Aug., 2025	DIFF	%DIFF
Nairobi	5	5	0	0.0
Rift Valley	10	12	2	20.0
Coast	14	5	-9	-64.3
Eastern	6	7	1	16.7
Western	0	2	2	0.0
Nyanza	7	6	-1	-14.3
Central	8	9	1	12.5
North Eastern	2	6	4	200.0
Total	52	52	0	0.0

In response to the threat of kidnappings and abductions, the Government has implemented a range of targeted interventions aimed at prevention, swift response, and victim support. They include:

- a) Strengthening rapid response and hostage recovery capabilities across all counties, including the establishment of a specialized Anti-Abduction Unit at the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) headquarters;
- b) Enhancing intelligence gathering and surveillance operations to track, apprehend suspects and disrupt kidnapping networks;
- c) Promoting cross-border cooperation and coordination for the tracking, investigation and prosecution of transnational kidnapping syndicates;

- d) Investing in advanced technology and specialized training to support tracking, forensic investigations and case management;
- e) Expanding community sensitization programmes and anonymous reporting platforms such as *Fichua kwa DCI*, to encourage public vigilance and timely reporting; and
- f) Providing victim support services, including counseling and psychosocial assistance, while increasing patrols and public awareness campaigns in high-risk areas.

Despite notable progress, several challenges continue to hinder effective prevention and response to kidnapping and abduction cases:

- a) Failure to report of such incidences, largely driven by fear, trauma or mistrust by public or local authorities; and
- b) Difficulties in tracing and prosecuting perpetrators, especially those who operate anonymously or across national borders, complicating law enforcement efforts.

The Government remains committed to eliminating the threat of kidnappings and abductions through strengthening prevention, response and recovery mechanisms by:

- a) Rebuilding public trust in security agencies through transparent investigations, community engagement and consistent communication to dispel misinformation and fear;
- b) Enhancing inter-agency and cross-border collaboration to effectively track, apprehend and prosecute perpetrators operating across borders;
- c) Expanding surveillance and digital forensic capabilities to monitor high-risk areas and improve real-time response to abduction incidents; and
- d) Scaling-up public awareness campaigns on personal safety, early warning signs and the importance of prompt reporting.

1.25 DRUGS AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE

Drug trafficking and abuse in Kenya remains one of the significant issues of national concern and have been identified as major threat to the well-being of citizens and national development. Kenya is a destination point for narcotics for local markets but with the bulk being on transit destined to Southern and Western Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle East and the Americas. The local narcotics are predominantly produced, trafficked and consumed in Mombasa, Migori, Kwale, Kilifi, Lamu, Nairobi, Kisii, Isiolo, Marsabit and Garissa counties.

Narco-traffickers have devised ways of sneaking drugs in and out of the country, through ungazetted entry points along Kenya's borders with Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda for onward movement to other destinations. Transnational criminal networks also exploit the country's excellent transportation connectivity to perpetuate the vice.

The drugs have continued to impact the populace, leading to a rise in drug-related crimes, health problems and societal breakdown. The financial burden on the health sector is considerable, with enormous resources being spent annually on treating drug-related issues.

During the period under review, there have been multiple seizures of narcotics and illegal drugs as shown in the Table 1.14 below while arrests have been made in various parts of the country. In total **6,062** persons were arrested (**5,515** males and **547** female). Out of these arrests, **647** cases were finalized, **5,415** cases pending before court, **15** cases were pending arrest of known accused and **38** cases pending under investigation.

Table 1.14: Summary of number of Seizures and Arrest

Type of Drug	No. of Persons Arrested	No. of Males Arrested	No. of Females Arrested	No. of Kenyans Arrested	No. of Foreigners Arrested	Quantity of Drug (Gms)
Heroin	28	21	7	25	3	189 sachets; 7000gms
Cocaine	35	21	14	30	5	44 Pellets; 76 Satchets; 12,800gms
Psychotropic Substances:						
Cozepam	1	1	0	1	0	28 tablets
Diazepam	4	4	0	4	0	264 tablets
Meth	1	0	1	1	0	1000 grams
Mdma	2	2	0	1	1	145 tablets and 10 grams
Bhang	5,991	5,466	525	5981	10	34 pellets, 1,538 sachets, 12 tablets, 20,932,000 grams, 156,184 rolls, 389 bales, 10,799 plants, 3,092 brooms, and 962 stones
Total	6,062	5,515	547	6043	19	

Recognizing the inherent dangers associated with drug trafficking and abuse to the nation, the Government has variously declared drug and substance abuse as serious threat to the country's stability and ordered nationwide crackdowns on drugs. Other measures implemented include:

- a) Enhanced security operations for search and arrest of perpetrators, and destruction of narcotic plants in the forests;
- b) Stakeholder engagement through whole-of-society approach to identify, profile and arrest syndicate leaders in drug trade;
- c) Continued liaising and sharing of information with international partners, leading to arrest and deportation of foreigners linked to drug trafficking;
- d) Enhanced public education and advocacy to equip members of the public with information and knowledge on drugs and substance abuse; and
- e) Promoted treatment, rehabilitation and reintegration of persons affected by drug abuse.

Despite ongoing efforts, several challenges continue to undermine the effectiveness and sustainability of the fight against drug trafficking and substance abuse:

- a) Presence of well-organized and adaptive drug trafficking networks, including foreign-linked syndicates that exploit legal and jurisdictional loopholes;
- b) Limited capacity for rehabilitation and reintegration, with inadequate facilities, funding and trained personnel to support recovering individuals across the country; and
- c) Corruption and collusion within law enforcement and administrative structures, which enable trafficking operations and hinder effective prosecution.

To secure and sustain gains made in the campaign against drugs and substance abuse, and to shield the country from entrapment of these vices, the Government commits to:

- a) Ensuring strict enforcement of all laws and strategies on narcotics and psychotropic substances;
- b) Strengthening regional and international co-operation in the fight against the vice;

- c) Fast-tracking investigation and prosecution of drug trafficking suspects;
- d) Enhance multi-faceted approaches in the campaign against drugs and substance abuse;
and
- e) Increasing access to treatment and rehabilitation services by ensuring accessibility and affordability.

1.26 ILLICIT BREWS

Illicit alcohol in Kenya represents a complex and pervasive challenge, with far-reaching socio-economic, security and health implications. Alcohol abuse undermines livelihoods, jeopardizes governance and is associated with crime. Illicit alcohol has been a significant issue of concern because of the serious public health risks with some unscrupulous brewers using ingredients such as methanol, herbicides, formaldehyde, Anti-Retroviral drugs (ARVs) and other toxins. These ingredients pose serious health risks and are the major causes of illicit alcohol-related deaths, blindness and other illnesses. These ingredients include ethanol and methamphetamine.

Further, the growing demand for consumption of illicit brews has sustained continued production, often in unsafe and unregulated conditions, despite the risks. This trend is exacerbated by the commercialized informal alcohol sector, with profound challenges of adulterated traditional brews and illicit second-generation alcohol, which compounds the risks to public health and safety.

The distribution networks of illicit brews often fund criminal activities and pose a challenge to law enforcement agencies.

During the period under review, the Government stepped up counter measures. Consequently, a total of **602,160** litres were netted showing a decrease of **265,605** litres compared to a similar period in 2023/2024 which recorded **867,765** litres netted. Additionally, **394,432** litres of illicit liquor were destroyed showing a decrease of **46,702** litres destroyed, compared to a similar period in 2023/2024. A comparative analysis of illicit brews is summarized in **ANNEX III**.

Cognizant of the negative effects of illicit alcohol, Government has taken the following measures:

- a) Enhanced a whole-of-society collaboration towards eradicating the demand and supply of illicit brews;
- b) Intensified public advocacy campaigns on the negative impacts of illicit and counterfeit alcohol;
- c) Strengthened joint collaboration efforts between the national and county Governments in order to eradicate illicit and counterfeit alcohol; and
- d) Collaborated with stakeholders to establish rehabilitation centres.

Despite intensified efforts to curb the production, sale and consumption of illicit brews, several structural and socio-economic challenges continue to undermine the effectiveness of interventions:

- a) Many individuals involved in the production and sale of illicit alcohol rely on the illicit trade as their primary source of income and livelihood, making enforcement socially sensitive and disruptive;
- b) Weak regulatory frameworks and corruption, which compromise the enforcement of alcohol control laws and enable continued operation of illegal enterprises;
- c) High cost and limited accessibility of legal alcohol, especially in low-income areas, drives demand for cheaper, unregulated alternatives despite the known health and anti-social hazards;
- d) Proliferation of counterfeit alcohol and cross-border ethanol smuggling, particularly from neighboring countries, fuels the supply of illicit brews and undermines local control efforts; and
- e) Illicit alcohol-related crimes are often treated as petty offences, attracting minimal fines and weak deterrents.

To ensure that illicit brews and counterfeit alcohol are eradicated and the citizenry is freed from its negative effects, the Government is committed to:

- a) Increasing access to rehabilitation and treatment services of affected persons;
- b) Sensitizing the stakeholders of traditional brews on legal provisions under the Alcoholic Drinks Control Act;

- c) Increasing patrols and surveillance to deter smuggling of ethanol across the border; and
- d) Enhancing multi-agency approach in fighting against illicit brews and promoting alternative as well as responsible livelihoods.

1.27 ILLEGAL ALIENS AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS

The presence of illegal aliens and undocumented immigrants in Kenya is primarily driven by the country’s relatively advanced socio-economic conditions in the region, making it attractive for illegal aliens seeking economic, educational and social opportunities. Kenya serves both as a destination and a transit hub for both regular and illegal immigrants from East and Central Africa, the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa regions. Many of these aliens, fleeing conflict, violence, and persecution enter the country without proper documentation, creating significant security challenges.

During the period under review, a total of **953** illegal aliens were arrested, representing a **36.4%** decrease compared to a similar period in 2023/2024 which recorded **1,498** arrests. Notably, majority of the illegal immigrants arrested were Ethiopian nationals; **670** accounting for **70.3%** of the total number of illegal aliens and undocumented immigrants arrested in the country. This was followed by Somalis, Burundians and Eritreans each recording **90, 69 and 74** arrests respectively.

Table 1.15 depicts the number of Nationalities of Illegal Aliens and Undocumented Immigrants Arrested.

Table 1.15: Nationalities of Illegal Aliens and Undocumented Immigrants Arrested

NATIONALITY	SEPTEMBER, 2023 _ AUGUST, 2024	SEPTEMBER, 2024 _ AUGUST, 2025	DIFF	%DIFF
Somalis	172	90	-82	-47.7
Tanzanians	2	9	7	350.0
Ethiopians	1156	670	-486	-42.0
Ugandans	11	18	7	63.6
Burundians	6	69	63	1050.0
Eritreans	84	74	-10	-11.9
Egyptians	12	11	-1	-8.3
Rwandese	3	0	-3	-100.0
S/Sudanese	23	0	-23	-100.0

Congolese	20	7	-13	-65.0
Nigerian	2	3	1	50.0
Others	7	2	-5	-71.4
TOTAL	1498	953	-545	-36.4

Cognizant of the dangers which can be borne by illegal aliens and undocumented immigrants, the Government undertook the following measures:

- a) Enforced laws governing immigration, particularly the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act, 2011 and various international agreements;
- b) Enhanced border security and control to prevent illegal entry;
- c) Prosecuted, repatriated and deported illegal immigrants;
- d) Enhanced collaborations with diplomatic missions; and
- e) Enhanced joint operations with agencies drawn from neighboring countries and international organizations.

Despite active enforcement measures, several challenges continue to hinder effective control and management of illegal immigration:

- a) Porous borders and limited surveillance coverage, particularly in remote and informal crossing points, which facilitate unauthorized entry;
- b) Insufficient technological capacity and outdated infrastructure for real-time monitoring, biometric verification and document authentication at some border points;
- c) Increased sophistication in human trafficking and document fraud, often involving organized transnational criminal networks; and
- d) Public acquiescence and limited awareness, which may result in non-reporting or harboring of undocumented migrants, especially in informal urban settlements or rural villages.

Going forward, the Government will enhance use of modern border management technologies, reviewing legislation to address emerging issues on the subject matter, as well as step up sensitization of the public about the risks associated with the vice.

1.28 TRADE IN CONTRABAND AND COUNTERFEIT PRODUCTS

The trade in contraband and counterfeit goods remained high in the country during the period under review, with negative implications on revenue collection, the Government’s industrialization agenda, and domestic enterprise as well as health and safety risks to the citizenry. The highest source of the contrabands remains neighboring states. The widely traded goods included sugar, electronics, cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. There is also prevalent use of pirated ICT hardware and software.

During the period under review, the contraband goods intercepted included; **52,075kgs** of sugar, **58,193 litres** of ethanol, **9,707 packets** of cigarettes, **24,570 cartons** of alcoholic drinks and other items as illustrated in Table 1.16 below:

Table 1.16: Contraband and Counterfeit goods intercepted

	SEPT., 2023 – AUG., 2024	SEPT., 2024 - AUG., 2025	VAR	% VAR
Sugar	100,390	52,075	-48,315	-48.1
Alcohol	192,137	24,570	-167,567	-87.2
Rice	19,900	0	-19,900	-100.0
Cooking oil	879	338	-541	-61.5
Spaghetti	2,345	9	-2,336	-99.6
Bags of fertilizers	685	521	-164	-23.9
Cigarette	2,345	9,707	7,362	313.9
Milk	2,390	3,437	1,047	43.8
Ethanol	715	58,908	58,193	8138.9
TOTAL	32,1786	149,565	-172,221	-53.5

The Government has implemented a series of coordinated interventions to disrupt illicit trade and safeguard national interests. Key measures include:

- a) Sustained crackdowns on contraband goods to disrupt distribution networks, arrest perpetrators and enforce compliance with trade regulations;
- b) Strengthening of multi-agency border surveillance efforts, enhancing coordination between security, customs and regulatory authorities;
- c) Public sensitization campaigns to raise awareness about the dangers of contraband goods and encourage reporting of illicit trade activities; and

- d) Deployment of advanced scanning and tracking technologies at strategic entry and exit points to detect and intercept illegal consignments.

Despite sustained efforts, several challenges continue to hinder the effective prevention and disruption of contraband trade in the country:

- a) Limited availability of modern detection equipment at some border posts, reducing the effectiveness of screening and interception efforts;
- b) Corruption and collusion between smugglers and unscrupulous public officials, which compromises enforcement operations;
- c) High demand for cheaper goods fueling black market activity and discouraging formal trade;
- d) Inadequate storage and handling facilities for seized goods, which complicates evidence management and legal processes; and
- e) Increased use of digital platforms and online marketplaces to distribute contraband goods, especially cosmetics and pharmaceuticals, beyond the reach of traditional enforcement tools.

To strengthen the fight against contraband trade and secure economic and public health interests, the Government is committed to:

- a) Acquiring and upgrading inspection technologies, including mobile scanners, surveillance cameras and digital tracking systems;
- b) Increasing staffing levels and patrol coverage in high-risk smuggling corridors to enhance presence and deterrence;
- c) Strengthening anti-corruption mechanisms within border enforcement and regulatory agencies to promote integrity and accountability;
- d) Fast-tracking prosecution and disposal processes for contraband-related cases to ensure swift justice and reduce backlog;
- e) Promoting inter-agency intelligence coordination and data sharing to effectively map and dismantle contraband networks;
- f) Enhancing public-private partnerships, particularly with the retail, transport, and ICT sectors, to improve reporting and disrupt illicit supply chains;
- g) Introduce Integrated Product Marking and Identification of all goods; and

- h) Allocating additional resources for comprehensive border surveillance and infrastructure development in vulnerable areas.

1.29 SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Sexual and gender-based violence is not only a major public health concern, but also a grave violation of an individual’s human rights and impacts on public safety and security. The vice marked by domestic violence, rape and honor killings stems from entrenched cultural norms and beliefs. The growing incidents of femicide not only endanger women's lives but also severely undermine the social fabric of the country, creating a climate of fear and insecurity.

The data on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) cases from September, 2024 to August, 2025 reveals a decrease of 4% in reported cases from 7,107 in 2023–2024 to 6,813 during the 2024–2025 period. Nairobi recorded 407 cases marking the highest reported in the country whereas Samburu County with 16 recorded the least number of cases. Counties such as Nairobi, Kisumu and Trans Nzoia saw significant reductions 146, 78 and 74 cases respectively. However, increases were recorded in Embu with 57, Kajiado 56 and Machakos 52 cases suggesting localized surges in SGBV. The overall decline in 2024–2025 at 4% indicate policy impacts, though persistent hotspots (e.g. Kajiado’s 53% rise) underscore the need for targeted County-specific strategies combining enforcement awareness and survivor support to sustain progress. The comparative analysis is presented in Figure 1.3 while a county analysis of SGBV is shown in ANNEX IV.




Figure 1.3: Comparative Number of Cases of SGBV reported

1.29.1 Gender disparities in perpetration

The number of male perpetrators decreased from **7,029** to **6,759** representing a decrease of **270** or 3.8 percentage decrease. A sharp decline was also noted in the number of female perpetrators as shown in Table 1.17 below:

Table 1.17: Gender disparities in perpetration

Offences	Sept.,-2023- August, 2024		Sept., 2024- August, 2025		Diff		%Diff	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Unnatural Offences (Sodomy)	71	21	44	0	-27	-21	-38.03%	-100.00%
Indecent Act	227	4	193	11	-34	7	-14.98%	175.00%
Sexual Assault	128	1	122	7	-6	6	-4.69%	600.00%
Rape	836	2	900	4	64	2	7.66%	100.00%
Attempted Rape	107	0	17	1	-90	1	-0.84112	0
Gang Rape	134	0	16	0	-118	0	-88.06%	0
Defilement	5,299	5	5414	5	115	0	2.17%	0.00%
Att. Defilement	53	1	7	0	-46	-1	-0.86792	-100.00%
Gang Defilement	50	0	2	2	-48	2	-0.96	0
Subjecting a Child to Cruel Punishment	19	11	6	6	-13	-5	-68.42%	-45.45%
Child in Need of Care and Protection	58	76	0	0	-58	-76	-100.00%	-100.00%
Murder (Related to GBV)	17	4	11	1	-6	-3	-35.29%	-75.00%
Threatening to Kill (Domestically)	30	19	27	7	-3	-12	-10.00%	-63.16%
Total	7,029	144	6,759	44	-270	-100	-3.84%	-69.44%

1.29.2 Analysis of SGBV victims

The number of female victims decreased from **6,921** to **6,655** representing a decrease of 266 or 3.8 percentage decrease. Table 1.18 below illustrates this.

Table 1.18: Analysis of SGBV victims

Offences	Sept.,-2023- August, 2024		Sept., 2024- August, 2025		Diff		%Diff	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Unnatural Offences (Sodomy)	40	9	40	4	0	-5	0.00%	-55.56%
Indecent Act	7	220	14	190	7	-30	100.00%	-13.64%
Sexual Assault	2	127	17	112	15	-15	750.00%	-11.81%
Rape	7	832	9	895	2	63	28.57%	7.57%
Attempted Rape	0	105	1	17	1	-88	0	-83.81%
Gang Rape	1	74	0	8	-1	-66	-100.00%	-89.19%
Defilement	13	5,310	20	5,369	7	59	53.85%	1.11%
Attempted defilement	0	39	0	7	0	-32	0	-82.05%
Gang defilement	0	35	0	2	0	-33	0	-94.29%
Subjecting a child to cruel punishment	14	16	3	9	-11	-7	-78.57%	-43.75%
Child in need of care and protection	63	112	6	14	-57	-98	-90.48%	-87.50%
Murder (Related to GBV)	11	10	8	4	-3	-6	-27.27%	-60.00%
Threatening to kill (domestically)	17	32	10	24	-7	-8	-41.18%	-25.00%
Total	175	6,921	128	6,655	-47	-266	-26.86%	-3.84%

The following measures were taken to address the menace:

- a) Established the *Technical Working Group on SGBV, Including Femicide* tasked with investigating the trends, hotspots and causes of SGBV and femicide, with a view to recommending solutions to strengthen legal and institutional frameworks;

- b) Commissioned a study on femicide;
- c) Issued new guidelines for management of *Airbnbs* and other facilities offering accommodation services;
- d) Increased efforts to raise awareness about femicide and SGBV through public education and advocacy; and
- e) Strengthened gender desks within police stations to handle femicide-related cases.

The following challenges, however, constrained efforts to contain the vice:

- a) Deep-seated cultural and societal beliefs that contribute to gender-based violence and femicide, making enforcement of laws challenging;
- b) Limited resources and personnel to effectively address the growing incidences of SGBV; and
- c) A tendency of media to sensationalize cases, which often harm victims' families and survivors and compromise investigations.

Going forward, the Government commits to fully implement the report by the Technical Working Group on SGBV, including Femicide and strengthen criminal justice system structures to address SGBV.

1.30 ROAD SAFETY AND TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

The Government has transitioned from fragmented interventions to a structured and multi-sectoral road safety management strategy. This strategy focuses on legislation and community engagement to reduce road traffic accidents and enhance road safety awareness.

During the period under review, the total number of Road Traffic Accidents (RTAs) increased from **10,719 to 11,413** translating to a **6.5%** rise, compared to the previous year. The increase was occasioned by a rise in reported fatal and serious injuries RTAs from 3,835 to 4,184 and 5,495 to 5,792 translating into a 9.1 per cent and 5.4 per cent rise respectively. This is presented in the Figure 1.4 below while data with variance is presented in **ANNEX V**.




Figure 1.4: Comparative Analysis of Accidents

1.30.1 Categories of Accident Victims

The country recorded an increase in RTA victims rising from **23,829** in 2023/2024 to **24,434** translating into a 2.5% increase. The number of fatalities rose from 4,506 to 4,794 translating into a 6.4% increase. Further, slight injuries victims increased from 7,578 during the period in 2023/2024 to 8,127 representing a 7.2 per cent rise. In contrast, serious injury victims reduced from 11,745 in 2023/2024 to 11,513 translating into a 2.0 per cent drop.

Table 1.19 depicts the comparison of Road Traffic Accident Victims for the period.

Table 19: Comparison of Road Traffic Accident Victims

Categories of accidents	September, 2023- August, 2024	September, 2024- August, 2025	Variance	% Change
Fatalities	4,506	4,794	288	6.4
Serious injuries	11,745	11,513	-232	-2.0
Light injuries	7,578	8,127	549	7.2
TOTAL	23,829	24,434	605	2.5

1.30.2 Fatalities as Per Road User Group

The period under review shows an increase in the number of fatalities as per road users' group among pedestrians, drivers, pillion passengers and motor cyclists by **3.8%**, **10.6%**, **17.4%** and **13.4%** respectively. However, a decrease in the number of fatalities among passengers was noted from 833 to 805 translating to a 3.4 per cent drop as illustrated in the Table 1.20 below.

Table 1.20: Comparison of Fatalities as per Road User Group

Road user	September 2023- August 2024	September 2024- August 2025	Variance	% Change
Pedestrians	1,729	1,795	66	3.8
Drivers	385	426	41	10.6
Passenger	833	805	-28	-3.4
Pillion Passenger	390	458	68	17.4
Pedal Cyclist	79	74	-5	-6.3
Motor Cyclist	1,090	1,236	146	13.4
Total	4,506	4,794	288	6.4

During the period under review, the Month of December 2024 recorded the highest number of fatalities recording **466**. This is occasioned by a rise in road traffic due to the mass movement of population during the festive season. The month of November recorded an increase of 81 fatalities from **292** in 2023/2024 to **373** representing a **27.7%** rise. Table 1.21 below presents the Monthly distribution of fatalities in the period under review.

Table 1.21: Table of Distribution of Fatalities per Month

Months	September 2023- August 2024	September 2024- August 2025	VAR	% CHANGE
September	338	402	64	18.9
October	330	382	52	15.8
November	292	373	81	27.7
December	421	466	45	10.7
January	389	392	3	0.8
February	374	360	-14	-3.7

Months	September 2023- August 2024	September 2024- August 2025	VAR	% CHANGE
March	403	387	-16	-4.0
April	388	408	20	5.2
May	341	395	54	15.8
June	411	414	3	0.7
July	382	396	14	3.7
August	437	419	-18	-4.1
Total	4,506	4,794	288	6.4

In response to rising concerns over road traffic accidents and safety violations, the Government has implemented a series of comprehensive interventions aimed at reducing fatalities and enhancing road user responsibility. Key measures include:

- a) Enhancement of traffic control and introduction of automated management systems on major highways, including the phased deployment of automated traffic laws' enforcement technologies to deter violations and promote compliance;
- b) Implementation of nationwide road safety campaigns to raise awareness on safe driving practices, accident prevention and responsible road use;
- c) Establishment of County Transport and Safety Committees, in collaboration with county Governments, to localize road safety planning, regulate the boda boda sector, improve infrastructure and support grassroots campaigns such as *Usalama Barabarani*;
- d) Upgrading road infrastructure and traffic management systems in accident-prone areas to eliminate black spots and improve flow and safety;
- e) Alignment of national sensitization activities aligned with the UN Global Road Safety Week (May 12–18, 2025), including driver clinics, speed limiter checks, pedestrian awareness, medical screenings and footbridge cleaning across counties; and
- f) Utilization of data-driven interventions, including blackspot mapping, installation of surveillance and speed cameras, and live tracking of public and commercial vehicles to enhance enforcement and risk monitoring.

Despite progress in improving road safety, several systemic and operational challenges continue to hinder the realization of safer transport networks:

- a) Absence of a comprehensive national transport master plan, limiting strategic planning, investment coordination and long-term infrastructure development;
- b) Fragmented public road transport systems and weak enforcement of existing traffic laws, leading to widespread non-compliance and chaotic road use;
- c) Poor road conditions and inadequate signage in certain areas, which contribute to frequent accidents and reduced navigability;
- d) Increasing incidences of reckless and drunk-driving, particularly during peak traffic hours, posing risks to both motorists and pedestrians; and
- e) Rapid and unregulated growth of the bodaboda sector, compounded by fragmented oversight, limited licensing and low rider training standards among riders.

To address the challenges in road safety and reduce traffic-related injuries and fatalities, the Government remains committed to implementing the following strategic actions:

- a) Fast-tracking the enactment and integration of legislation focused on enforcing road safety standards, including speed limits, alcohol testing and penalties for dangerous driving;
- b) Investing in road infrastructure upgrades and expansion, particularly in high-risk areas, to enhance safety and improve traffic flow;
- c) Scaling-up public awareness campaigns targeting risky driver behaviors such as speeding, distracted driving and drunk driving, with a focus on long-term behavioral change;
- d) Enhancing emergency response mechanisms, including the development of coordinated strategies to ensure timely medical and logistical assistance to accident victims;
- e) Upgrading vehicle registration and driver licensing systems to enable administrative enforcement of traffic penalties during license renewals and vehicle inspections; and
- f) Digitizing crash data collection and analysis to support evidence-based policymaking, risk identification and performance monitoring in road safety management.

1.31 BODA-BODA SECTOR

The Boda Boda sector has emerged as one of the most dynamic components of Kenya's informal economy, with a significant number of riders now embracing both traditional and hybrid customer engagement models. Many have transitioned into digital platforms and other app-based services, which facilitate customer onboarding and offer streamlined, tech-driven transport solutions. It plays a vital role in providing affordable and accessible transport solutions, particularly in underserved urban and rural areas.

Over the past two decades, the sector has experienced exponential growth, driven by high youth unemployment, rapid urbanization and the rising demand for last-mile connectivity. Currently, over 2 million riders are actively engaged in the sector, providing direct employment to more than 2 million people and indirectly supporting millions more. The Boda Boda sector contributes significantly to Kenya's economy through job creation, revenue generation and facilitation of trade.

Despite the myriad of opportunities availed by the sector, it has also evolved into a potentially negative force with repercussions on security and public safety. With close to 3 Million motor cycle operators, most of who are not properly documented or professionally trained, the sector has become associated with street crime, traffic accidents, criminal activities, recklessness, impunity and violence. Some have become easy recruits as gangs-for-hire by rogue politicians, businessmen and other unscrupulous individuals.

The Government, in collaboration with private and civil society actors, has initiated several interventions in a bid to regulate the Boda Boda sector, key among them:

- a) Enhancement of road safety campaigns and round table stakeholders' engagements at the national and county levels;
- b) Encouraged self-regulation;
- c) Encouragement of structured SACCOs to organize riders and improve financial inclusion; and
- d) Deployment of community policing strategies to reduce crime involving motorcyclists.

Despite its important contribution to the economy and societal wellbeing, the Boda Boda sector continues to face the following challenges:

- a) Weak regulation and poor enforcement of traffic laws;
- b) High accident rates, often linked to reckless riding and lack of training;
- c) Insecurity, where some riders have been implicated in criminal activities or falling victim to attacks;
- d) Congestion and disorder in major towns due to lack of designated parking or stages;
- e) General culture of impunity;
- f) Anonymity associated with the Boda Boda sub sector;
- g) Inadequate access to affordable financing and proper riding gear; and
- h) Low uptake of insurance cover to cater for accidents.

Going forward, the Government will employ the following strategies to sustainably grow and professionalize the Boda Boda sector:

- a) Enforce standardized training and licensing of all riders;
- b) Roll out periodic road safety stakeholder meetings to fast-track realization of gains on progress made from previous engagements;
- c) Partner with Counties to develop proper infrastructure, including Boda Boda lanes, sheds and parking bays;
- d) Encourage all Boda Boda riders to register with their local leadership to enable quick identification and apprehension of criminal elements masquerading as riders; and
- e) Strengthening collaboration with the police through, the established leadership structures to promote effective self-regulation in the Boda Boda sector.

1.32 GAMING AND GAMBLING

The growth of gaming in Kenya is driven by increasing societal acceptance and the potential for economic benefits. Additionally, rapid technological advancements have made gaming more accessible, while complicating efforts to trace criminal activities. The rise of gambling addiction, especially among youth through online platforms, has raised serious social and national security concerns due to its links to mental health issues, family breakdowns and financial distress. Illegal gaming activities further undermine

Government revenue and are often associated with crimes, such as money laundering and terrorism financing.

The widespread availability of locally made gaming machines (*Mchina*) and the rise of unregulated online gaming platforms have worsened the problem, exposing underage users to the vice, and contributing to addiction, crime and broader social instability.

In an effort to combat the social ills and insecurities associated with irresponsible gaming and gambling, the Government has implemented the following interventions:

- a) Institutionalized conditions whereby all licensed casino operators must register their gaming companies with the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC);
- b) Established collaboration with social media platforms and mobile money service providers to block or press charges on identified unlicensed local and foreign gaming websites and platforms;
- c) Through a multi-sectoral approach, integrated companies operating online gaming activities to Real-Time Tax Remittance Systems;
- d) Undertaken continuous crackdown on illegal operators of gaming machines and online operators;
- e) Established a Multi-Agency Rapid Response Team to address the crisis and a helpline for reporting cases of irresponsible gambling or addiction;
- f) Enhanced whole-of-society collaboration on gaming and gambling matters affecting national security within its regulatory framework; and
- g) Deployment of counselors to institutions of learning and provided helplines for those struggling with addiction.

However, despite the Government efforts, the following challenges are encountered in streamlining the industry:

- a) Growing trend of players embracing gaming and gambling as an alternative source of livelihood/income;
- b) Proliferation of gaming machines;
- c) Pervasiveness of virtual and online games with limited oversight; and

- d) The low cost of engaging in gaming and gambling activities.

Going forward, the Government commits to:

- a) Fast-track amendments to relevant laws to guarantee responsible gaming and gambling in the country;
- b) Enforce the watershed period (between 0500 Hours to 2200 Hours), as off limits for gaming and gambling advertisement on mass media; and
- c) Enhance enforcement of gaming regulations to guard against abuse.

1.33 UNEMPLOYMENT

During the period under review, employment in the formal sector stood at 16.4% while the informal sector stood at 83.6% with growth in the formal sector employment rising by 2.4 %. The employment landscape was characterized by loss of jobs as a result of downsizing as well as closure of some companies, inadequate access to capital and training facilities for expansion of enterprise and skill portfolios among youth, fraudulent activities by recruitment agencies, mismanagement of some pro-youth programmes, exploitation of unemployed youth for political expediency and increased concern over gambling among citizens, and in particular, the unemployed to earn an income. The obtaining situation heightened the susceptibility of youths to engage in anti-social activities such as recruitment into criminal gangs and terrorism, as well as involvement in petty crime, resulting in heightened insecurity.

Kenya faces significant challenges related to unemployment, particularly among its youth, who constitute a large portion of the population. Some of the key challenges include:

- a) A “youth bulge,” against the backdrop of limited job opportunities, leading to high unemployment rates among young people;
- b) Inadequate preparedness for the job market. There is a mismatch between the skills available and the skills demanded by the job market that contributes to unemployment; and
- c) Factors such as seasonality in agro-based production, erratic climatic conditions that drives low demand for goods and services also contribute to job losses and unemployment.

To address the challenge of unemployment, the Government has taken the following measures:

- a) Labour migration: The Government continues to engage with external partners to secure job placements for Kenyans in foreign jurisdictions;
- b) Hustler Fund: Between July, 2024 and June, 2025, the Hustler Fund in Kenya reached over 26 million customers, with a strong base of 9 million repeat borrowers, thereby supporting entrepreneurship;
- c) Creative economy: The digital transformation spurred significant increase in mobile subscriptions, content creation, virtual trading, mobile money usage, digital connectivity and digital inclusion attributable to the digital hubs;
- d) Affordable Housing Programme (AHP): During the review period, the AHP provided 244,000 direct and indirect jobs both within the construction sector and related industries and services, accounting for 24.4% of the overall target of 1 million from the programme;
- e) Policy reforms: The Government also developed the following policies to address unemployment:
 - i. The National Skills Development Policy, aimed at promoting sustainable socio-economic development through the development of a skilled workforce;
 - ii. The National Policy Framework for Career Guidance, aimed at promoting lifelong learning, sustained employability and social equity by enhancing access, equity, quality and relevance in the provision of career guidance in the country; and
 - iii. The National Policy on Linking Industry to Education, Training and Research: The goal of this policy is to promote and strengthen the linkage between industry and education, training and research towards developing a knowledge-based and globally competitive economy.
- f) The Government has prioritized access to funding for MSMEs, including youth entrepreneurs, through programmes such as the Hustler Fund; and
- g) The Government is making efforts to create a favourable environment for investment.

Going forward, the Government will:

- a) Ensure proper management of existing pro-youth empowerment programmes;
- b) Continue to implement the affordable Housing Scheme, which will not only provide access to affordable houses, but also create employment opportunities;
- c) Continue developing appropriate policies that support economic growth, creation of jobs, and employment-intensive enterprises;
- d) Continue to export surplus labour and to strengthen monitoring of labour recruitment agencies;
- e) Develop adaptive legislative reforms, to include the regulation of private employment agencies;
- f) Prioritize investment in *skills for the future* and in sectors with strong employment-creation potential; and
- g) Revitalize structured framework for diaspora remittances and investment.

1.34 CORRUPTION

Corruption remains a pervasive threat to national security with far reaching negative effects on Kenya's socio-economic and political development as well as damaging the country's global standing. The vice manifested in bribery, embezzlement of funds, abuse of office, misappropriation of public resources, procurement fraud and favouritism. During the review period, EACC received and processed a total of 584 bribery reports. In the Financial Year 2024/2025, the Commission finalized 17 bribery cases in court, resulting in 12 convictions, four acquittals and one withdrawal.

The National Ethics and Corruption Survey conducted by EACC in 2024 indicates that the national average bribery amount decreased from KSh. 11,625 in 2023 to KSh. 4,878 in 2024. The 2024 survey further revealed that bribery is the most common form of corruption witnessed in public offices, with giving of bribes at 52.1% and receiving bribes at 41.9%. Other forms of corruption include favoritism at 22.5%, abuse of office at 14.6%, tribalism and nepotism at 11.8%, and embezzlement of public funds at 11.7%.

Despite the measures taken by the Government, the fight against corruption continue to face policy, legal, political, socio-cultural and institutional challenges. These include:

- a) Inadequate legal framework for enforcement of Chapter Six of the Constitution on Leadership and Integrity;
- b) The politicization and ethnicization of the fight against corruption and unethical conduct;
- c) Growing culture of impunity and unethical practices in society; and
- d) Slow judicial process in finalizing cases on bribery and corruption.

In response the Government has intensified efforts against bribery and corruption through the following measures:

- a) EACC has stepped up recovery of corruptly acquired and unexplained assets, and is currently pursuing forfeiture of assets estimated at KSh. 50 billion that were obtained corruptly;
- b) Prioritizing high-impact investigations based on value involved, public interest and personalities involved;
- c) Conducted investigations into ethical breaches and made various recommendations, including prosecutions, advisories, and cautions besides disrupting corruption networks;
- d) Supported the development of specific Leadership and Integrity Codes for public entities;
- e) Conducted system reviews in public entities to identify systemic weaknesses in policies, procedures and practices;
- f) Forged strategic linkages, collaborations and partnerships with key stakeholders;
- g) Undertook audit of public transactions, books of accounts and other uses of funds;
- h) Digitalization of Government services to reduce human interface; and
- i) Public awareness campaigns to encourage whistle-blowing.

Going forward, the Government is committed to:

- a) Scaling up integrity testing programme for detecting and preventing bribery at service delivery points;
- b) Intensifying oversight of budget allocations and the implementation of capital-intensive projects;
- c) Strengthening efforts to recover assets obtained through corruption and to confiscate unexplained wealth;
- d) Enhancing collaboration with regulatory, professional bodies and the criminal justice system to improve enforcement and adherence to professional codes of ethics;
- e) Fast-tracking finalization/implementation of The Conflict-of-Interest Act, Whistleblower Protection Bill, 2023, and Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2025; and
- f) Facilitating measures for public access to Declaration of Income Assets and Liabilities (DIALs) to enhance transparency.

1.35 DOCUMENT FRAUD

Document fraud poses serious threat to Kenya's national security as it erodes public and institutional trust in official records, thus undermining governance and deters both local and international investment. Additionally, it facilitates criminal enterprises, including financial crimes such as money laundering, creation of fraudulent bank accounts, and illegal access to credit. Terrorist organizations may also use forged identity documents and travel papers to plan and execute attacks. Similarly, forged passports and visas enable illegal immigration, compromising border control. Moreover, document fraud is also frequently used to evade tax, resulting in significant losses to The National Treasury.

To curb the vice, the Government has employed the following measures:

- a) Using high security features in all official documents, such as the use of watermarks and serial numbers that are verifiable;
- b) Enabled online verification portals for documents;
- c) Regularly auditing and monitoring document issuance systems;
- d) Training staff to detect forgery signs; and

- e) Restricting access to sensitive printing equipment and materials.

Going forward, the government is committed to:

- a) Intensifying intelligence-led crackdown on cartels and syndicate involved in document fraud;
- b) Capacity building to detect fake documents by specifically training more document examiners; and
- c) Enhancing public awareness on fake documents.

1.36 REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY LANDSCAPE

During the period under review, the regional and international peace and security landscape was marked by escalating intra-state conflicts and insurgencies, as well as heightening geopolitical rivalries, coupled with a steady erosion of multilateral cooperation frameworks, which had negative implications on Kenya's economic and security interests. The evolving dynamics within the Horn of Africa, Great Lakes Region, Middle East, Europe and the Americas, continued to exert wide ranging impact on Kenya, fueling both traditional and emerging security threats, including the destabilizing impacts of armed conflicts in Kenya's neighborhood, cyber security risks and transnational crime, all of which posed direct and indirect risks to Kenya's strategic interests. In this context, the implementation of deliberate and forward-looking national responses, anchored on proactive diplomacy as well as strong regional and multilateral engagements were pursued towards safeguarding Kenya's sovereignty and national interests.

REGIONAL LANDSCAPE

1.36.1 HORN OF AFRICA

a. Somalia

The increased threat of terrorism from Al-Shabaab and Islamic State, escalating political wrangles amidst external interference continued to hinder efforts to stabilize Somalia. Although Somalia Security Forces and allied forces achieved some operational successes, their ability to maintain control over liberated areas was limited by capacity, logistical and equipment constraints. The security situation was further worsened by funding difficulties faced by the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM), amid shifting geopolitical priorities among key donors and stakeholders. Additionally, growing rivalry

among external powers and the resurgence of piracy off Somalia's coast further complicated the security landscape.

Additionally, fighting between the Somalia National Army (SNA) and Jubaland Security Forces (JSF) within Somalia's Jubaland Region, which borders Kenya's North Eastern Region, spilled over into parts of Mandera County. These conditions were exploited by Al Shabaab militants to attempt to infiltrate the country, but our security agencies remained on the alert.

Kenya continued its engagement with Somalia, as well as at regional and international levels, to address the security threats stemming from Somalia, and to maintain momentum on ongoing efforts to stabilize the country.

b. Ethiopia

The prolonged localized conflicts in Ethiopia's Amhara and Oromia Regions continue to destabilize the country, thus affecting Kenya's security as well. Additionally, the rising political tensions in Tigray and the slow implementation of Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) increased the chances of renewed hostilities. The prevailing situation poses cross-border risks such as arms and drug trafficking, illegal immigration and infiltration by militant groups, notably the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). Additionally, cross-border conflicts over natural resources, banditry, illegal mining and cattle rustling remain a threat to security and good neighbourliness.

Kenya relies on Special Status Agreement with Ethiopia to address common security challenges, including launching joint operations along the border targeting OLA, which has been successful in curbing the insurgent activities.

c. Sudan

During the period under review, Sudan remained engulfed in civil war, pitting the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which further complicated the security environment in the Horn of Africa. The warring parties' apparent determination to achieve military victory, supported by sustained backing from their respective allies, served to prolong the war, thereby worsening security and humanitarian conditions in the country with adverse regional security implications. Kenya supported regional peace initiatives and engaged the warring sides in Sudan as part of efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution to the Sudan crisis and maintain cordial trade and diplomatic relations with the country.

d. South-Sudan

South Sudan continued to grapple with political divisions within the Transitional Government of National Unity during the review period, amid ongoing delays in implementing the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), whose mandate was extended from February 2025 to February 2027. The situation was worsened by increasing differences between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Government (SPLM-IG) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), mainly over the stalled peace process, and the resurgence of armed conflict in parts of the country. The ongoing situation in South Sudan contributed to the influx of refugees into Kenya and created other security risks, including the spread of illicit SALWs.

Kenya supported efforts to stabilize South Sudan by hosting the High-Level Mediation on South Sudan (The *Tumaini Initiative*), in addition to backing other regional and international interventions. Kenya also sustained diplomatic engagements with South Sudan's leadership towards advancing peace efforts.

1.36.3 GREAT LAKES REGION

During the period under review, persistent conflicts in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continued to destabilize the Great Lakes Region, with regional peace initiatives struggling to make progress. Renewed stabilization efforts under the joint East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Peace Process, where Kenya played a leading role as peace facilitator, helped reduce hostilities in the region. Additionally, peace efforts led by the United States and Qatar strengthened engagement among the warring parties in Eastern DRC towards resolving the conflict.

Kenya's ongoing support for a comprehensive and peaceful resolution continues to aid de-escalation, while protecting its strategic interests.

1.36.2 EAST AFRICA

a. Uganda

Uganda remained politically stable, with focus gradually shifting towards the January 2026 General Election. However, the country continued to contend with security threats linked to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) operating in Eastern DRC. Key security concerns for

Kenya included cyclic cross-border cattle raids between Uganda's Karamojong and Kenya's Pokot communities, the proliferation of small arms and harassment of Kenyan fishermen in Lake Victoria.

The Government of Kenya continues to engage with Uganda to resolve issues of mutual concern through mechanisms such as the Kenya-Uganda Joint Border Administrators' Committees.

b. Tanzania

Tanzania's political and security environment remained stable leading up to the October 2025 General Election. On the security front, Tanzania continued to grapple with the threat of terrorism from Islamic State operating in Northern Mozambique, which is eager to expand its activities, including radicalization and recruitment in the country. While Tanzania's security interventions have largely succeeded in curbing the terrorist group's operations within its territory, the transnational nature of the terrorism threat poses risks to Kenya, as the Islamic State in Mozambique's facilitation networks extend to the wider East Africa Region.

Kenya continues to engage the Government of Tanzania on issues of mutual interest through established bilateral frameworks to address common security threats.

1.36.4 GLOBAL SECURITY LANDSCAPE

The global security environment is experiencing multiple crises, marked by increased military posturing, inter-state wars, competition for access to critical minerals, protectionist trade policies, climate change and strategic realignments. The ongoing crises in the Middle East, Far East, and parts of Eastern Europe have created significant instability and transformation, with widespread implications for international security and Kenya.

From the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the unfolding humanitarian disaster in Gaza, to persistent instability in Syria, Yemen, and tensions involving Iran, armed conflicts are becoming more prolonged and complex. Moreover, rising tensions among global powers, partly due to competing hegemonic ambitions, continue to heighten geopolitical and geo-economic challenges with adverse effects on Kenya's interests.

Key global crises affecting Kenya during this period include:

United States-China competition

During the period under review, hegemonic competition between the United States and China centered on their efforts to dominate artificial intelligence, cyberspace technology and access to critical minerals supply chains. The current US Administration policy shift towards trade and transactionalism has exerted pressure on trade and diplomatic relations especially with developing countries, including Kenya. Additionally, the growing East-West rivalry fostered increased nationalism and inward-looking politics in the United States and Europe, adversely impacting their spending on development and security assistance to Kenya and the wider African continent.

Kenya maintained its engagement with the major powers through established multilateral frameworks and bilateral engagements, aiming to address common international challenges while safeguarding its interests.

a) Russia-Ukraine conflict

The prolonged Russia-Ukraine war continued to disrupt global energy and grain supply chains, while the warring parties' adoption of strategies for a lengthy conflict led to intensified offensives supported by military aid flows. The conflict's evolving dynamics prompted increased defense spending and inward-looking policies, especially within the European Union, affecting existing economic and security partnerships with Kenya and the wider region.

Kenya remained proactive in maintaining its bilateral and multilateral engagements to mitigate the war's effects and work towards peaceful resolution.

b) Middle East Crisis

During the period under review, the Middle East experienced heightened instability driven by the escalation of the Israel-Palestine War in Gaza, which was worsened by the eruption of conflict between Israel and Iran. The situation had significant implications for stability in the Middle East and international security. The increasing hostilities and mutual mistrust caused by the crises in the Middle East continue to put pressure on Kenya's diplomatic, security and economic relations. Additionally, the revival of terror networks between the Middle East and Eastern Africa, along with militant attacks on commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, has raised freight and insurance costs, affecting Kenya's maritime trade.

Kenya was guided by non-alignment stance, emphasizing the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in the Middle East and supporting international and regional efforts to address the resulting terrorism and maritime security risks.

1.37 KENYA'S DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC POSTURE

Kenya continued to leverage strategic opportunities to promote its national interests, sustain diplomatic partnerships and reinforce its role in regional and global peace and security initiatives. In response to the increasingly complex global and regional security challenges, the Government of Kenya undertook the following measures:

- a) Reviewed the country's foreign policy to realign diplomatic posture and enhance agility in response to the rapidly evolving regional and international security dynamics; and
- b) Maintained multilateral engagements within the East African Community (EAC), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Africa Union (AU) and United Nations on conflict resolution, counter-terrorism, organized crime, border security and migration. Kenya's pivotal role in the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission in Haiti as well as the joint EAC-SADC peace initiative on DRC illustrates the country's commitment to the advancement of regional and international peace efforts, aligned to attainment of its strategic interests.

Going forward, the Government is committed to:

- a) Sustain regional anchorage and leverage global peace diplomacy to facilitate resolution of conflicts;
- b) Leverage regional frameworks to address common threats, including terrorism, and other organized criminal activities;
- c) Upholding bilateral commitments with partners to address common security threats; and
- d) Promoting multilateralism, through actively participating in and advocating for global cooperation in response to global challenges and advancement of the common good.

2.0 CHAPTER TWO: CROSS-CUTTING INITIATIVES

2.1 BOTTOM-UP ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AGENDA (BETA)

Kenya's transformative development trajectory remains anchored on the Bottom-Up Economic Transformation Agenda (BETA), a comprehensive framework designed to achieve inclusive growth, equitable development, and long-term national resilience. The period under review experienced notable acceleration in the implementation of key national programmes, despite fiscal pressures and emerging global uncertainties. The Government emphasized decentralization of opportunities, expansion of access to basic services and strengthening of national productivity through grassroots engagement and institutional reforms.

BETA is anchored in value chain development and grassroots inclusion. As Kenya approaches the final two years of MTP IV, critical success depends on diversifying and expanding training programmes, enhancing county-level capacity, and securing sustainable financing. The framework continues to be the principal vehicle for economic reform, aimed at lifting millions of *Hustlers* out of poverty by catalyzing grassroots economic activity, thereby enhancing resilience of vulnerable population.

2.2 YOUTH EMPOWERMENT

The country is experiencing a youth bulge with 36.6% of the country's population aged between 18-35 years. While the high number of youths present opportunities, a large segment is currently grappling with socio-economic challenges and limited empowerment programmes, with youth unemployment rate currently standing at 20.2%. During the review period, the unemployment landscape was characterized by job losses owing to downsizing and closure of some manufacturing and service sector firms, inadequate access to capital and training facilities for expansion of enterprises and skill portfolios among youth.

Given the above, the Government implemented various initiatives enshrined in the BETA to address socio-economic challenges faced by the youth. These include the implementation of the *Ajira Digital*, *Jitume Kazi*, *Climate Worx*, and Affordable Housing Programmes (AHP). Already, several AHP sites across the country have created over 200,000 direct and indirect jobs for the youth, while 25,000 young people have been recruited so far in the *Climate Worx* Initiative. Furthermore, the Government aims to enlist over 100,000 youth nationwide in the *Climate Worx* Initiative.

The Government also executed bilateral labour agreements (BLAs) under the *Kazi Majuu* initiative, which offered youth employment opportunities in foreign countries. Similarly, several policies were developed to promote digital innovation such as the National Artificial Intelligence Draft Strategy (2024), Kenya Cloud Draft Policy (2024), Data Protection Policy, and the Kenya 10-year National Innovation Masterplan. Equally, the Government in partnership with the World Bank, intends to launch the National Youth Opportunities Towards Advancement (NYOTA) Programme to offer vocational training, apprenticeships, entrepreneurship development and financial literacy to about 800,000 youth. The project will enhance employability, skills recognition and access to decent work, which are key pillars of the BETA. The government also plans to scale up recruitment to the NYS from the current 18,000 to 100,000 young people for the next three years.

2.3 ABOLISHING VETTING FOR NATIONAL ID CARD REGISTRATION

On 5th February, 2025, the Government issued a proclamation discontinuing the practice of vetting during the issuance of identification documents in all border Counties. The abolition of vetting is part of a broader effort to ensure that all Kenyans have equal access to national identification. The Government is implementing new registration guidelines to reflect this change, aiming to streamline the process and ensure equal access to identification for all citizens.

To ensure compliance and reduce fraud in the process, the Government has put the following measures in place to strengthen identity proofing mechanisms:

- a) Local Registration: Applicants must register in their home Counties or permanent places of residence to enable easier community-based verification;
- b) Biometric Attestation: A biological parent or guardian must validate the applicant's identity via a left thumbprint on the application form. Chiefs/Assistant Chiefs must also certify the applicant's authenticity, similarly using their biometric signature. This enhances accountability, enabling tracing in cases of fraudulent registration;
- c) Post-registration intelligence vetting: Registration officers are required to submit weekly reports of registered applicants to national security agencies. These agencies can flag cases of concern, prompting immediate action from the responsible Registration of Persons offices and NGAO; and

The Government has also increased the capacity for ID card production, aiming to process new requests efficiently. This includes increasing printing capacity and deploying additional personnel to handle the increased workload. Furthermore, a 24-hour service has been introduced to expedite the processing and production of IDs.

2.4 E-CITIZEN SERVICE DELIVERY

The Government is implementing an electronic platform for service delivery in all MDAs. This process involves re-engineering to digitize paper records and convert core agency processes from manual to electronic forms. The method also entails the elimination of the existing numerous payment channels and bank accounts, and establishing a single payment gateway. The objective of this change is to bring about transparency and accountability in revenue collection.

The process has been challenging since many agencies are reluctant to accept change and adopt the newly introduced processes. The reluctance to comply by these agencies is inhibiting the Government's efforts towards entrenching e-Government and bolster the fight against corruption through the elimination of multiple payment channels.

The e-Citizen service delivery process requires that only bona fide persons be enrolled as e-Citizen user account holders. This is achieved by conducting background checks on the authenticity of identification documents, including IDs and passports. A secure enrollment platform ensures access to various services available through it and enables the tracing of specific individuals transacting on the platform.

The Government is collaborating with the main mobile telecommunication service providers to identify all active unauthorized payment gateways for prompt closure, while developing a strategy of enrolling every eligible citizen on the e-Citizen platform.

Despite the successes, the following challenges hinder the implementation of e-service delivery:

- a) Inadequate data center hosting infrastructure;
- b) Inadequate e-Citizen technological capacity;
- c) Cyber security and fraud risks;
- d) Poor internet coverage and connectivity;

- e) Digital illiteracy among the citizenry;
- f) Slow adoption by some agencies that are resistant to onboarding their services; and
- g) Continued use of non-designated pay bills by MCDAs, including those who have onboarded their services.

Going forward, the Government is enhancing cyber security measures through the deployment of AI-powered fraud detection tools and reengineering of the e-Citizen services platform.

2.5 NEW LAWS/AMENDMENTS AND POLICIES

During the period under review, the Government enacted and/or amended various laws and policies, including:

- a) **Cybersecurity and Data Protection Act (Amendments):** With the increasing importance of cybersecurity, there have been amendments to the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act (2018). These reforms focus on enhancing data protection laws and responding to cybercrime more swiftly;
- b) **National Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2025–2030:** Launched in March 2025, the strategy outlines pillars around AI infrastructure, data policy, research, and governance;
- c) **National Strategy for Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism (NSPCVE) 2025:** Reviewed and implemented the NSCVE 2016 to adapt to the changing dynamics in terrorism and violent extremism environment;
- d) **Terrorism Financing Laws:** In line with international standards, legal instruments to trace and freeze assets linked to terrorist organizations have been updated such as the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism (Amendment) Bill, 2024;
- e) **Drafting of the Strategic Goods Control Bill, 2025:** The Bill seeks to control trade in strategic goods, technology and related services, to prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery;
- f) **Border Security and Immigration Laws:** With Kenya’s proximity to conflict zones, there has been a stronger push to tighten border security. The Government has made amendments to the Immigration Act (2023), which includes enhancing vetting

processes for those entering the country and improving coordination with neighboring countries on transnational threats, including terrorism and organized crime; and

- g) **Revised National Defense Policy (2024):** Kenya's defense policy was reviewed to align with contemporary security challenges, particularly terrorism, cyber threats, and threats arising from regional instability. The revised policy emphasizes inter-agency cooperation, peacekeeping contributions, and building military capacity.

2.6 SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS

The Government has been undertaking legislative and policy initiatives aimed at giving effect to the recommendations of the National Taskforce on Improving Terms and Conditions of Service and Other Reforms for Members of the National Police Service, Kenya Prisons Service and the National Youth Service, and to improve security services in the country.

In line with this, the Government has embarked on several activities, including:

1. Reviewing the following Acts and developing the following Bills, now generally in their final stages of consultation:
 - a) The National Police Service Amendment Bill (2025) is in the process of internal reviews following policy position and direction issued by the Cabinet Secretary before it is forwarded to the Attorney General for formal drafting and further action. The principal object of the National Police Service (Amendment) Bill, 2025 is to amend the National Police Service Act (Cap. 84) to provide for structural, functional, and operational reforms to enhance the efficiency, accountability, and professionalism of the Service. The draft Bill proposes to introduce comprehensive changes, including the formal establishment of the Criminal Investigations Service pursuant to Article 247 of the Constitution, regulation of forensic services, enhancement of internal oversight, alignment of disciplinary and administrative procedures, and protection of members in service-related circumstances;
 - b) The Independent Policing Oversight Authority (Amendment) Bill 2025 proposes to amend the Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act, (Cap. 86) to strengthen the Authority's investigative and oversight mandate, enhance its operational efficiency, and align its provisions with evolving legal and institutional needs;

- c) The National Police Service Commission (Amendment) Bill, 2025 seeks to amend the National Police Service Commission Act, 2011 (Cap. 85) to strengthen the Commission's mandate in human resource management, streamline governance structures, and enhance accountability in the National Police Service;
 - d) The National Police Service Veterans and Fallen Heroes Draft Bill, 2025 is to establish a legal framework for the recognition, registration, and support of Police Veterans and Fallen Heroes. The Bill provides for the welfare of former members of the National Police Service and the dependents of officers who die in the line of duty. It further seeks to provide structured benefits, ceremonial honors, and a national mechanism for recognition, remembrance, and institutional support;
 - e) The National Forensic Science draft Bill, 2025 has been prepared to put in place a legal framework to regulate the provision of forensic science services in Kenya; and
 - f) The Public Order Management (Amendment) Bill, 2025 preparation is still under consultations between the Ministry of Interior and National Administration, National Police Service and the Office of the Attorney-General.
2. The Government also developed the National Policing Policy, Public Order Management Policy and Community Policing Policy, which are now at formulation stage, with draft documents having been presented to stakeholders for comments and feedback.
3. Other activities that are on course with respect to Police reforms include:
- a) Service delivery reforms, including National Police Service Charter Review, Service Standards Review, and Police Station Service Delivery Improvement Strategy;
 - b) Implementation of Performance Management, including performance contracting;
 - c) Staff establishment and Career progression guidelines, including non-uniformed staff;
 - d) Organizational restructuring of Kenya Police Service, Administration Police Service, and DCI, including policy directives on restructuring of formations, units, and

components, review of the service standing orders and development of Standard Operating Procedures for Operational Units;

- e) Establishing mechanisms and procedures for compliance with the Sixth Schedule of the National Police Service Act on mandatory notification of death and serious injuries that occur within Police premises;
- f) Establishing mechanisms and procedures to ensure the honoring of summons issued by IPOA in execution of its mandate;
- g) Mechanisms and procedures to allow unconstrained access to police premises, including training institutions, by IPOA;
- h) Capacity building and sensitization on external oversight functions, including the number of police officers trained and sensitized on IPOA functions and mandate; and
- i) The Government has further started developing the National Government Administration Police Unit Standard Operating Procedures (NGAPU SOPs) through a committee appointed by the Inspector General. The SOPs will provide for set out step-by-step instructions for NGAPU functions.

4. The functions and mandate of the unit are:

- i. Support Government agencies in the enforcement of administrative functions and the exercise of lawful duties;
- ii. Provide security and render support to the National Government Administrative Officers in the performance of their lawful duties and responsibilities within the administrative units;
- iii. Provide protective security to Government premises within their respective administrative units;
- iv. Support other Government agencies in the enforcement of national policies, laws and regulations;
- v. Provide security during lawful high-risk operations conducted by the National Government Administrative Officers, including regulatory enforcement activities and campaigns against abuse of alcohol and drugs in collaboration with other stakeholders;

- vi. Provide security during public functions, including community gatherings, in collaboration with other security agencies;
 - vii. Apprehend offenders and preserve exhibits as the first responders, where applicable;
 - viii. Support the National Government Administrative Officers in the execution of conflict management and peacebuilding initiatives; and
 - ix. Collaborate with other law enforcement agencies in responding to incidents requiring coordinated operational efforts.
5. In respect of Stakeholders Engagement, a Police Reforms Stakeholders Engagement Plan has been developed, including mapping of stakeholders and categories, stakeholders' groups and levels of engagement.
6. Finally, an abridged version of the Report of the National Taskforce on Improvement of the Terms and Conditions of Service and other Reforms for members of the National Police Service has been prepared together with stakeholders' engagement schedule.

2.7 WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH

During the period, Government agencies worked collaboratively in addressing complex threats to national security and public safety by effectively and efficiently utilizing available resources. This approach was employed in the management of border security, security operations, control of drugs and substance abuse, and contrabands, among others, through the sharing of intelligence and expertise.

Some of the notable engagements that employed the whole of Government approach, including:

- a) Operation *Maliza Uhalifu II*, which aimed at restoring peace and security in the North Rift Region by addressing banditry, cattle rustling, communal conflict and social and economic infrastructural development aimed at supporting peace and security efforts.
- b) Operation Amani Boni within the Boni Enclave, which aimed at creating favourable conditions for peace and development in Lamu County and its environs.

2.8 PROMOTION OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS

The Government is committed to ensuring free and fair elections by providing an enabling environment for political parties, ensuring media freedom and strengthening the capacity of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). During the period under review, the Government instituted initiatives such as legislative reforms, institutional restructuring and public engagement as part of efforts to enhance transparency and inclusivity. These include:

- a) Operationalization of the IEBC (Amendment) Act, 2024, seeking to enhance transparency, efficiency and accountability within the Commission;
- b) Appointment of new IEBC commissioners in July 2025 and subsequent reconstitution and establishment of critical Committees such as Election Operations Committee and Boundaries Delimitation Committee, to enhance operational efficiency and improve service delivery; and
- c) Facilitating strategic partnerships with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), among others, to offer training, capacity building, technical support, civic and voter education.

Despite Government efforts to address some pertinent concerns, delays in voter registration, boundary delimitation and conducting by-elections, coupled with limited civic education, continue to fuel public apprehension.

Going forward, the Government endeavors to:

- a) Enhance budgetary support to IEBC to reduce dependence on donor support in key areas, including capacity building and electoral technologies, and facilitate nationwide civic education campaigns to boost awareness and institutional trust;
- b) Implement transparency requirements for foreign funding and set limits on foreign involvement in electoral processes; and
- c) Empower Government officials on interference risks, besides monitoring and countering foreign malign activities.

CHAPTER THREE: RECOMMENDATIONS

To strengthen Kenya's national security and enhance its role in regional and international peace efforts, continued leadership backed by robust diplomacy and strategic partnerships remains essential not only for its own stability but for the broader Horn of Africa, East Africa, and Great Lakes regions.

Parliament is therefore urged to support the following strategic actions:

a) Legislation

The Government invites Parliament to participate actively in the legislative process by debating, amending and supporting proposed Bills to ensure that they reflect the needs and aspirations of the people.

b) Internal security funding

The National Assembly is urged to enhance allocation of financial resources to security agencies to facilitate execution of their respective mandates of providing the requisite safety and security to enable our people to freely engage in their socio-economic and political pursuits as provided by the Constitution. The key areas requiring attention include:

- i. Remuneration and other terms of service;
- ii. Training and recruitment;
- iii. Modernization (vehicles, firearms, ICT systems, forensic labs);
- iv. Security operations;
- v. Expansion of correctional facilities and rehabilitation programmes;
- vi. Enhancing security at borders and entry points;
- vii. Specialized funding to combating terrorism, drug trafficking and cybercrime;
- viii. Fire services, rescue teams and disaster preparedness; and
- ix. Confidence-building measures between the citizenry and security agencies.

c) Support strategic investments in diplomacy

To enhance national resilience against external shocks and emerging threats, Parliament should significantly increase budgetary allocations to the State Department for Foreign

Affairs, with a strategic focus on peace and security diplomacy. Enhancing funding is essential to expand Kenya's diplomatic footprint in key geopolitical hubs, provide Foreign Service officers with specialized training in mediation, conflict prevention and crisis response, and reinforce inter-agency coordination between Foreign Affairs, Defense and Intelligence Services. Such investment will bolster Kenya's capacity to anticipate, manage, and influence complex regional and global security dynamics.

d) Sustain engagement in multilateral peace support operations and humanitarian response initiatives

Going forward, strengthening the country's legal framework and commitment to international peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions remains a priority. The framework provides clear guidelines on the deployment, funding, and coordination of Kenyan personnel in AU, UN, regional missions and efforts in Haiti while affirming Kenya's strategic posture in global peace efforts.

The realization of the foregoing requires forging strategic alliances with like-minded states and leveraging multilateral platforms to advance Africa's collective interests and ensure equitable representation in global decision-making processes.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION

The national security environment during the reporting period has been characterized by a mix of evolving domestic threats, regional instability and emerging global dynamics and opportunities. Kenya has responded to these challenges with a balance between proactive security measures and ongoing reforms aimed at enhancing security. The report highlights progress achieved through multi-agency operations, improved intelligence capabilities, community engagement, and the adoption of new technologies in addressing evolving threats such as terrorism, cybercrime, organized criminal gangs, and cross-border crimes. The report also emphasizes the Government's commitment to addressing vulnerabilities that fuel insecurity, including unemployment, drug trafficking, and the misuse of technology for criminal activities.

Regionally, Kenya has continued to play a prominent role in peacekeeping, mediation and cooperation, working closely with neighboring States and international partners in stabilization efforts in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions. These diplomatic and security engagements, complemented by strong border management and law enforcement reforms, are vital for safeguarding Kenya's sovereignty and economic interests.

Looking ahead, the Government remains committed to strengthening national security institutions, modernizing security tools and systems, and enhancing partnerships at bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels. The upcoming period will focus on building resilience against evolving threats, implementing security sector reforms, and aligning security priorities with national transformation programmes to foster a stable and secure environment in which the country can continue to thrive.

ANNEXE 1: DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES SUMMARIES FOR SEPTEMBER, 2024 TO AUGUST, 2025

Type Of Drug	No. Of Persons Arrested	Offences			Kenyans		Foreigners		Quantity														
		Possession	Cultivation	Trafficking	Male	Female	Male	Female	Pellets	Sachets	Tabs	Kgs	Rolls	Bales	Plants	Brooms	Stones	Seedlings	PUI	P.A.K.A	P.B.C	FINALISED	
Bhang	5991	4840	117	1034	5459	522	7	3	34	1538	12	20932	156184	389	10799	3092	962	6	34	15	5345	646	
Cocaine	35	0	0	35	17	13	4	1	44	76	0	12.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	35	0
Heroin	28	10	0	18	19	6	2	1	0	189	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	27	1
Cozepam	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Ketamine	4	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	264	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0
Meth	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
Mdma	2	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	2	0	145	0.01	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
	6062	4855	117	1090	5501	542	14	5	80	1803	449	20953	156184	389	10799	3092	962	6	38	15	5415	647	

ANNEX II: COUNTY ANALYSIS OF LIVESTOCK THEFT

County	Rustling	Theft	Total
Mombasa	0	0	0
Kwale	0	7	7
Kilifi	0	161	161
Tana River	400	0	400
Lamu	0	0	0
Taita Taveta	0	2	2
Sub-Total	400	170	570
Garissa	176	0	176
Wajir	0	0	0
Mandera	0	190	190
Sub-Total	176	190	366
Marsabit	276	233	509
Isiolo	866	494	1360
Meru	2752	621	3373
Tharaka Nithi	0	2	2
Embu	26	7	33
Kitui	149	12	161
Machakos	122	158	280
Makueni	0	37	37
Sub-Total	4191	1564	5755
Nyandarua	0	100	100
Nyeri	0	90	90
Kirinyaga	0	26	26
Muranga	0	13	13
Kiambu	0	2	2
Sub-Total	0	231	231
Turkana	3391	135	3526
West Pokot	150	107	257
Samburu	1715	310	2025
Trans-Nzoia	0	64	64
Uasin Gishu	0	5	5
Elgeyo Marakwet	64	264	328
Nandi	20	57	77
Baringo	1750	492	2242
Laikipia	3058	867	3925
Nakuru	0	176	176
Narok	171	187	358
Kajiado	0	146	146
Kericho	0	15	15
Bomet	0	5	5
Sub-Total	10319	2830	13149
Kakamega	0	64	64
Vihiga	0	34	34
Bungoma	0	6	6
Busia	0	4	4

County	Rustling	Theft	Total
Sub-Total	0	108	108
Siaya	0	23	23
Kisumu	0	48	48
Homabay	0	1	1
Migori	25	6	31
Kisii	0	8	8
Nyamira	0	18	18
Sub-Total	25	104	129
Nairobi	0	0	0
Sub-Total	0	0	0
Total	15111	5197	20308
County	Rustling	Theft	Total
Mombasa	0	0	0
Kwale	0	7	7
Kilifi	0	161	161
Tana River	400	0	400
Lamu	0	0	0
Taita Taveta	0	2	2
Sub-Total	400	170	570
Garissa	176	0	176
Wajir	0	0	0
Mandera	0	190	190
Sub-Total	176	190	366
Marsabit	276	233	509
Isiolo	866	494	1360
Meru	2752	621	3373
Tharaka Nithi	0	2	2
Embu	26	7	33
Kitui	149	12	161
Machakos	122	158	280
Makueni	0	37	37
Sub-Total	4191	1564	5755
Nyandarua	0	100	100
Nyeri	0	90	90
Kirinyaga	0	26	26
Muranga	0	13	13
Kiambu	0	2	2
Sub-Total	0	231	231
Turkana	3391	135	3526
West Pokot	150	107	257
Samburu	1715	310	2025
Trans-Nzoia	0	64	64
Uasin Gishu	0	5	5
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Nandi	20	57	77
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County	Rustling	Theft	Total
Laikipia	3058	867	3925
Nakuru	0	176	176
Narok	171	187	358
Kajiado	0	146	146
Kericho	0	15	15
Bomet	0	5	5
Sub-Total	10319	2830	13149
Kakamega	0	64	64
Vihiga	0	34	34
Bungoma	0	6	6
Busia	0	4	4
Sub-Total	0	108	108
Siaya	0	23	23
Kisumu	0	48	48
Homabay	0	1	1
Migori	25	6	31
Kisii	0	8	8
Nyamira	0	18	18
Sub-Total	25	104	129
Nairobi	0	0	0
Sub-Total	0	0	0
Total	15,111	5,197	20,308

ANNEX III: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL ILLICIT BREWS-RELATED DATA

REGIONS	SEPT., 2023-AUG., 2024			SEPT., 2024-AUG., 2025			DIFF			% DIFF		
	PERSONS ARRESTED	AMOUNT OF LIQUOR NETTED	AMOUNT OF LIQUOR DESTROYED	PERSONS ARRESTED	AMOUNT OF LIQUOR NETTED	AMOUNT OF LIQUOR DESTROYED	PERSONS ARRESTED	AMOUNT OF LIQUOR NETTED	AMOUNT OF LIQUOR DESTROYED	PERSONS ARRESTED	AMOUNT OF LIQUOR NETTED	AMOUNT OF LIQUOR DESTROYED
COAST	437	12,636	32,234	136	13,529	8,410	-301	893	-23824	-69	7	-74
N/EASTERN	16	9	0	23	70	0	7	61	0	44	678	0
EASTERN	1,444	37,027	4,605	772	53,326	12,097	-672	16,299	7,492	-47	44	163
CENTRAL	4,835	66,635	14,240	432	13,980	5,355	-4403	-52,655	-8,885	-91	-79	-62
R/VALLEY	53,591	369,108	208,983	2,733	243,658	165,750	-50,858	-125,450	-43,233	-95	-34	-21
WESTERN	2,795	89,131	10,681	1,151	88,269	62,410	-1,644	-862	51,729	-59	-1	484
NYANZA	3,581	254,796	146,266	918	108,418	69,570	-2,663	-146,379	-76,696	-74	-57	-52
NAIROBI	11,122	38,423	24,125	1,125	80,911	70,840	-9,997	42,488	46,715	-90	111	194
TOTAL	77,821	867,765	441,134	7,290	602,160	394,432	-70,531	-265,605	-46,702	-91	-31	-11

ANNEX IV: COUNTY ANALYSIS OF SGBV CASES

Counties	Sept., 2023- August 2024	Sept., 2024- August, 2025	Diff	% Diff
Mombasa	231	244	13	5.63%
Kwale	187	126	-61	-32.62%
Kilifi	344	324	-20	-5.81%
Tana River	39	28	-11	-28.21%
Lamu	43	49	6	13.95%
Taita Taveta	84	91	7	8.33%
Garissa	37	81	44	118.92%
Wajir	35	35	0	0.00%
Mandera	28	30	2	7.14%
Marsabit	57	50	-7	-12.28%
Isiolo	32	41	9	28.13%
Meru	201	188	-13	-6.47%
Tharaka Nithi	60	50	-10	-16.67%
Embu	72	129	57	79.17%
Kitui	172	187	15	8.72%
Machakos	164	216	52	31.71%
Makueni	172	196	24	13.95%
Nyandarua	97	84	-13	-13.40%
Nyeri	137	138	1	0.73%
Kirinyaga	108	86	-22	-20.37%
Murang'a	190	175	-15	-7.89%
Kiambu	346	368	22	6.36%
Turkana	84	63	-21	-25.00%
West Pokot	45	49	4	8.89%
Samburu	7	16	9	128.57%
Trans Nzoia	193	119	-74	-38.34%
Uasin Gishu	142	160	18	12.68%
Elgeyo Marakwet	44	44	0	0.00%
Nandi	108	119	11	10.19%
Baringo	57	66	9	15.79%
Laikipia	90	63	-27	-30.00%
Nakuru	305	347	42	13.77%
Narok	143	136	-7	-4.90%
Kajiado	105	161	56	53.33%
Kericho	102	113	11	10.78%

Counties	Sept., 2023- August 2024	Sept., 2024- August, 2025	Diff	%Diff
Bomet	141	184	43	30.50%
Kakamega	251	193	-58	-23.11%
Vihiga	149	126	-23	-15.44%
Bungoma	293	274	-19	-6.48%
Busia	168	135	-33	-19.64%
Siaya	155	114	-41	-26.45%
Kisumu	315	236	-79	-25.08%
Homabay	189	174	-15	-7.94%
Migori	223	208	-15	-6.73%
Kisii	282	282	0	0.00%
Nyamira	127	108	-19	-14.96%
Nairobi	553	407	-146	-26.40%
Total	7,107	6,813	-294	-4.14%

ANNEX V: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

Categories of Accidents	September, 2023— August, 2024	September, 2024— Augusts, 2025	Variance	% Change
Fatal Accidents	3835	4184	349	9.1
Serious Injury Accidents	5495	5792	297	5.4
Slight Injury Accidents	1389	1437	48	3.5
TOTAL	10719	11413	694	6.5